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avoiding dangerous situations, such as passenger
relations training to avoid conflict. The effect “full
wrap” bus exterior advertising has on onboard
activity and safety of passengers is also explored.
This project is presented in synthesis form.

FOREWORD
The safety of passengers and employees is a primary
concern of transit systems and has become an
increasingly important issue to transit bus drivers
themselves, hereafter referred to as “operators.”
Many transit agencies have experienced incidents of
assaults against their bus operators that have resulted
in serious injuries or deaths. These incidents can
also expose passengers to assault and injury. Even
when there are less serious consequences, assaults
on operators can lower their morale, increase
absenteeism, and strain labor-management relations
over whether or not the agencies are doing enough to
protect their employees.
There is also substantial cost to transit agencies in
terms of lost availability of operators who rightfully
go on workers’ compensation status. A number of
transit agencies use different techniques to minimize
the possibilities of assaults against their bus
operators and passengers.
Many use either
uniformed or plainclothes police officers or security
guards on particularly troubling routes. Digital
video cameras strategically placed inside buses are
also being used to help discourage criminal assaults
as well as other unwanted behavior such as graffiti
and unwarranted claims of injuries from passengers
(or alleged passengers). Perhaps the most visible
effort to discourage assaults on operators is the
provision of enclosures that separate the operators
from anyone else on the bus and protect them from
attacks. However, while this method can provide
enhanced protection to bus operators, it might
negatively affect passenger relations and increase the
image of a bus as a place where crime might be
committed.
This project surveyed transit agencies that have
employed these techniques to determine their level
of success, cost effectiveness, and acceptance by
both bus operators and passengers. The project also
identifies other techniques transit systems are using
to increase the chances of their bus operators
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exposed to bus passengers. A modesty panel behind
the operator’s seat does minimize distractions from
passengers as well as the glare from onboard
lighting, but few other barriers provide physical
separation and protection for the bus operator.

SUMMARY
Data from the National Transit Database reveal that
bus operators are relatively secure from violent
crime, despite well-publicized exceptional incidents
like what happened in Seattle. By far, the most
common violent offense against bus operators is
aggravated assault. The second most common
violent offense against bus operators is robbery.
Rape is rare and homicide is virtually unheard of,
except for the killing of operator Mark McLaughlin
in Seattle in 1998.

In general, transit agencies typically employ more
than one technique to provide onboard security,
“packaging” various methods to get the most bangs
for their limited bucks. With few exceptions (e.g.
cab enclosures and training) most methods are
employed to protect both employees and customers.
Furthermore, most methods employed yield
additional benefits that address concerns other than,
and in addition to, security matters. For example,
though Computer Aided Dispatch/Automatic
Vehicle Location (CAD/AVL) systems are typically
procured for their efficiencies in real-time fleet
management, their bus tracking features—integrated
with advanced communication systems and video
surveillance—provide significant advantages in
responding to transit crime.
Onboard video
surveillance systems provide records of onboard
passenger activity including vandalism. The video
can be used as powerful evidence in prosecuting
property damage crimes. Visible onboard systems,
security staff, and interior designs that mitigate
crime may facilitate positive marketing efforts to
discretionary customers, instilling greater confidence
in the security of the transit system.

Still, no one wishes to become a crime victim, and it
only takes a few well-publicized incidents to raise
valid concerns of what can be done to improve
personal security. Ignoring such concerns in the
long run may make it difficult for transit agencies to
hire and retain good bus operator employees.
Additionally, though incidents may be rare, their
impact can be fiscally significant in workers’
compensation payouts.
Because of the unique characteristics of bus service
provision, the security of bus operators may be seen
as less than that of workers in other transit modes,
e.g. train operators. These unique characteristics
derive primarily from the methods of fare collection
that have remained virtually unchanged over decades
of transit service. Even with the switch to exact
change and the introduction of prepaid fares, many
systems still offer transfers. The operator’s presence
serves to enforce the transit system’s fare policy
onboard buses. If the transfer receipt does not
clearly indicate the necessary information for the
receiving bus operator to validate, and/or if the
transit system’s transfer policies are vague or too
complex for customers to understand, disputes
between customers and bus operators may result.

Security methods may be classified differently for
analyses with different purposes. One classification
may differentiate technology or automated methods
versus manual methods using manpower.
Technology methods include communications
systems, covert alarms, video surveillance, and
CAD/AVL. Manpower methods primarily involve
security staff and/or police patrols.
The security methods for transit buses discussed in
this report may also be categorized as proactive,
reactive, or punitive. Crime prevention (proactive)
methods include video surveillance, “code of

Because of the varied responsibilities placed on bus
operators, the designs of their workstations on
American transit buses logically submit to function.
In most cases, the bus operator is nearly fully
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conduct” postings, Crime Prevention Through
Environmental Design (CPTED) principles, operator
cab enclosures, security staff, police officers, and
violence prevention/anger management training.
Incident management (reactive) methods include
CAD/AVL systems, video/audio surveillance,
security staff, police officers, and self defense
training.
Punishment-based (punitive) methods
include state laws and local ordinances to protect
public transit employees and customers by providing
special punishments and laws that codify greater
charges for transit crimes.

and dispatch, which has a large impact on a transit
agency’s sensitive operating budget. The security
features of CAD/AVL may be viewed as added
benefits. Similarly, the benefits of onboard video
surveillance are shared among security, risk
management, maintenance, and marketing. The
survey for this project only asked respondents’
perceptions of the methods in addressing security of
bus operators.
Interestingly, violence prevention training was rated
the technique with the highest effectiveness-to-cost
ratio.
This may reflect the transit industry’s
conservative nature in that violence prevention
training has been the standard reinforcing response
to keeping bus operators safe from crime. Changing
times and attitudes are apparent, however, in the
application of more aggressive strategies.

According to the results of the survey, the four
highest rated methods in terms of effectiveness were
in-house security, an enclosure to protect operators
in new bus specifications, plainclothes sworn police,
and an enclosure to protect bus operators retrofitted
into existing buses. The three least expensive rated
methods were violence prevention training, a panic
button that changes the message of the headsign, and
plainclothes security.
The three highest
effectiveness-to-cost ratios belong to violence
prevention training, in-house security, and
plainclothes security.

The average scores and effectiveness-to-cost ratios
for each surveyed method are indicated in the
following table. The reader is cautioned, however,
not to blindly seize the scores. The limited sample
size of the survey—31 transit agencies—may not
represent the unique conditions or circumstances of
each and every U.S. transit system. They may
provide guidance, but should not be used as the sole
basis in decision-making.

Further analysis shows that sworn police
consistently rate high in terms of effectiveness; their
cost, however, also rates relatively higher than most
other methods. This could support the belief that
“you get what you pay for.”
Furthermore,
manpower is almost always more expensive than
technology due to annualized salaries and fringe
benefits.

The full report provides further insights into the
advantages and disadvantages of each security
technique to protect bus operators. It also includes
examples from transit systems that employ the
techniques, discovered through research and agency
contacts to support this report.

Keeping in mind the survey’s narrow focus of each
method’s role in keeping bus operators secure from
crime, lower rated methods may actually warrant
consideration. For example, CAD/AVL rated a solid
“good” in effectiveness, but its cost was also rated
“expensive” which resulted in the lowest
effectiveness-to-cost ratio among all surveyed
methods. However, the benefits of CAD/AVL are
primarily concerned with effective fleet management

(Table on following page.)
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Bus Operator Security Survey
Average Response Ratings
METHODS !

Effectiveness
(1 to 4)

Cost (1 to 3)

Effectiveness :
Cost Ratio

2-Way Radio

3.1

2.2

1.4

dispatch

3.0

2.3

1.3

headsign

2.7

1.7

1.6

CAD / AVL

3.0

3.0

1.0

Video Cameras Onboard

3.2

2.5

1.3

contracted

2.7

2.3

1.2

in-house

3.8

2.0

1.9

uniformed

3.0

2.1

1.4

plainclothes

3.0

1.7

1.8

contracted

3.3

2.3

1.4

in-house

3.4

2.2

1.5

uniformed

3.3

2.2

1.5

plainclothes

3.6

2.2

1.6

Specialized
Operator Training

self-defense

2.8

2.0

1.4

prevention

2.9

1.4

2.1

Structure to
Protect Operator

retrofit

3.5

2.5

1.4

new specs

3.7

2.5

1.5

Panic Button

Security
(Onboard)

Sworn Police
(Onboard)
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Late Wednesday night, 10 January 2001, a young
male assaulted a Port Authority “T” (light rail)
operator in Pittsburgh. The assailant had attempted
robbery, armed with a razor knife. The “T” operator
suffered a serious facial cut. The criminal was not
caught.4

INTRODUCTION
A Violent Environment?
In July 1989 an irate passenger was kicked off a
public transit bus at Fort Lauderdale’s main airport.
Seeking revenge, the passenger boarded the next bus
in pursuit of the bus operator who expelled him from
his bus. When he caught up to the first bus, he shot
and killed the operator and another passenger. Then,
while hijacking a car for his escape, the killer shot
and paralyzed a motorist who also died months
later.1

Most recently, on Wednesday, 2 May 2001, a bus
was hijacked in Los Angeles following a suspected
drug-related shooting in a mostly-vacant apartment
building. The incident began with police officers
pursuing the suspect when his fleeing victim
collapsed outside the police union headquarters.
Running from police, the suspect—armed with a
semi-automatic handgun—boarded an MTA bus,
held his gun to the head of the operator, and ordered
her to drive. Witnesses said the suspect locked his
arm around the operator’s neck as she drove through
more than a dozen blocks in downtown Los Angeles.
The bus crashed into a minivan, killing the driver,
before crashing into other cars parked in a lot. The
assailant was apprehended a short distance away
while attempting to hijack a car. The bus operator,
Ema Gutierrez, suffered a broken nose and
collarbone, a potential broken knee, and cuts on her
neck and face. Five passengers also sustained
injuries. In a city that is home to the American film
industry, the sensational incident provoked
comparisons to the 1994 action movie, “Speed” in
which a transit bus speeds through Los Angeles, its
passengers hostage to an onboard bomb.5

On Friday afternoon, 27 November 1998, a
southbound Metro bus with about 35 passengers was
at the north end of the Aurora Bridge in the Fremont
neighborhood, approaching downtown Seattle.
Unexpectedly, a passenger sitting in the front section
of the 60-foot articulated bus, fired multiple shots at
operator Mark McLaughlin, and then shot himself in
the head. The bus crashed through a bridge railing
and plunged about 50 feet below, hitting the edge of
an apartment building, before landing upright on the
ground. The driver and killer were dead and a third
passenger died from his injuries the next day.
Nineteen passengers were hospitalized. There was
no apparent motive for the killing, and witnessing
passengers confirmed there had been no argument
between the driver and killer immediately preceding
the shooting. The killer had been unemployed and
in and out of a homeless shelter.2

Is the onboard environment of public transit vehicles
increasingly violent? Are bus operators more
subject to assaults, robberies, rapes, and homicides
than employees in other workplaces? Certainly the
events of violent crimes are more often publicized
today than in prior times. The shock of the shooting
tragedy in Seattle resonated throughout the
American transit industry, particularly within the
minds of front line operations staff. A recent report
by one of this report’s coauthors discussed bus
operators’ concerns for their personal security as one
factor in excessive employee absenteeism,

In August 2000, a female public transit bus operator
in Daytona Beach successfully obtained an
injunction against a male passenger that forbade him
from riding her bus. The unemployed man had no
driver’s license and rode buses daily to get around.
The bus operator felt harassed by and scared of him
after he talked about stalking other women, revealed
he knew her home address, and even went to her
house once. Other transit employees also reported
being harassed by him. The bus operator felt safer
in her workplace with the injunction.3
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transfer receipt does not clearly indicate the
necessary information for the receiving bus operator
to validate, and/or if the transit system’s transfer
policies are vague or too complex for customers to
understand, disputes between customers and bus
operators may result. Some transit systems have
eliminated the use of transfers, citing the actual costs
of customer disputes as well as the negative image
resulting from such disputes for the transit agency.
Other systems continue this traditional practice that
can also provide service planners additional data on
how customers use the system.

particularly on routes serving schools or high crime
areas.6
Why Bus Operators?
Why does this report focus specifically on the
security of bus operators? Because of the unique
characteristics of bus service provision, the security
of bus operators may be seen as less than that of
workers in other transit modes, e.g. train operators.
These unique characteristics derive primarily from
the methods of fare collection that have remained
virtually unchanged over decades of transit service.
On a bus, the typical customer pays his fare with
cash by himself inserting coins or bills in the farebox
located onboard at the front door entrance and next
to the operator. In earlier years, the bus operator
maintained a coin purse so that change could be
made for passengers paying with bills. Today most
every bus system requires boarding customers to
either have exact change or use prepaid fare media
(e.g. tickets, tokens, or passes) for payment. In
talking with veteran transit personnel, they are
unanimous in their views that the switch to “exact
change” fare policies sharply reduced incidents of
crime against bus operators. As bus operators no
longer carry cash, they are less attractive as targets
for robbery and other crimes.

Bus operators are also expected to provide
information to assist customers in making their trips
on the transit system. New or infrequent customers
may be unfamiliar with routes, schedules, fare
policies, streets or other landmarks and usually
require help from the bus operator. Providing
printed schedules and system maps onboard can help
minimize customers’ distracting the bus operator
from operating the vehicle, but customers prefer to
get information more quickly from the operator than
they can glean from complex printed timetables.
Finally, the bus operator is also expected to monitor
the comfort and security of riding customers.
Because most systems provide their bus operators
with onboard radios to communicate directly with
dispatchers, the bus operator is expected to confer
with dispatch whenever an onboard incident requires
immediate response from other transit personnel,
e.g. faulty air conditioning, a mess needing cleanup,
a fight between passengers, or a medical emergency.
The operator regularly monitors potential threats
from the onboard environment by checking his
rearview mirror. Since passenger capacity on
standard 40-foot transit buses is significantly less
than on multiple car trains, it is viewed as cost
effective to utilize a single bus operator, rather than
additional onboard staff or technologies, to address
customers’ needs.

However, even with the switch to exact change and
the introduction of prepaid fares, many systems still
offer transfers. A transfer is usually a slip of paper,
like a receipt, which indicates a customer has
already paid the fare on one bus route and allows
transfer to another route to complete his trip. Some,
but not all, systems impose a transfer fee, less than a
full fare charge. The bus operator receiving a
customer from another route must visually inspect
the transfer receipt to determine its validity.
Transfer policies typically require that a customer
use the transfer within a specified time limit and
only on specified routes.
Thus, the operator’s presence serves to enforce the
transit system’s fare policy onboard buses. If the
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Because of the varied responsibilities placed on bus
operators, the designs of their workstations on
American transit buses logically submit to function.
In most cases, the bus operator is nearly fully
exposed to bus passengers. A modesty panel behind
the operator’s seat does minimize distractions from
passengers as well as the glare from onboard
lighting, but few other barriers provide physical
separation and protection for the bus operator.

bus rapid transit (BRT) modes. In the meantime,
however, the need exists to continually address the
security of bus operators.
This report, therefore, focuses on current
developments in keeping bus operators secure from
crime. With few exceptions, most security methods
transit agencies employ address both employee and
patron. A secure environment benefits all onboard.
To the extent possible, this report highlights the
unique features of each security method that may
contribute to the security of the bus operator.

Versus Train Operators
In contrast, train operators on light rail transit (LRT),
heavy rail, and intercity commuter trains typically
have little interaction with customers. Customers
usually pay their fares prior to boarding the train,
either via ticket vending machines or ticket sales
personnel at the station. Most heavy rail systems
employ turnstiles to permit only those customers
who have paid their fares to have access to the
train’s boarding platform.
Some long haul
commuter trains still utilize an onboard conductor
who passes through the train to collect fares.

Methodology
Initially, a review of sources of information that may
exist on the subject of providing protection for bus
operators and passengers was conducted. This
included, but was not limited to, a review of the
Transportation Research Information Services
database, proceedings from conferences of the
American Public Transportation Association
(APTA), issues of APTA’s Passenger Transport
over the past four years, and an Internet search for
newspaper articles or reports that might be available.
The reviewed materials are listed in Appendix A.

Train operators usually sit in an enclosed cab,
isolated from the riding customers. If a customer
needs to speak with the train operator, he must use
an intercom, which is primarily limited for
emergencies only. This greatly discourages any
potential interaction between riding customers and
the train operator. Kiosks displaying information
about the transit system, routes, schedules, fare
policies, etc., are provided to a greater extent at train
stations than at bus stops. Onboard security is
typically provided by roving security guards or
police officers who randomly board trains during
their routine patrols or respond to specific incidents.

A survey was developed in both electronic and hard
copy formats and distributed to selected transit
agencies of various sizes across the U.S. The chief
purposes of the survey were to discover what
techniques transit agencies employ to keep their bus
operators secure from crime and how they perceive
each method’s effectiveness and cost, relative to the
others. Project staff made follow up telephone calls
to clarify answers and obtain additional and more
detailed information.
The project manager visited two (2) transit agencies
in Florida—Broward County Transit and MiamiDade Transit—that employ particularly interesting
and effective onboard security techniques. Input
was obtained from security and operations staff as
well as bus operators.

Thus, there is necessarily greater interaction with
customers for bus operators than for train operators.
This situation may change in the future with the
potential evolution of fare payment policies and
systems—e.g. the elimination of transfers,
prepayment and “proof of payment” typical on new
LRT and the emerging “rail on rubber wheels,” i.e.
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Draft versions of the report were shared with
members of a peer review committee composed of
transit professional staff involved in and
knowledgeable of security matters. Other reviewers
included researchers from the NCTR at the Center
for Urban Transportation Research (CUTR), located
at the University of South Florida in Tampa. Their
review and comment were invaluable in developing
the final report.
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Despite its shortcomings, the NTD is the only
comprehensive source of transit agency data. It
includes data that agencies potentially would not
collect on their own and thus would be otherwise
unavailable for analysis. The crime data reported for
years 1996-99 were analyzed for this section.

TRANSIT CRIME REPORTING
Since 1996, crime data on federally funded public
transit systems are collected in and reported from the
Federal Transit Administration (FTA)’s National
Transit Database (NTD), particularly Form 405,
Transit Safety and Security. According to the NTD
reporting manual, “All transit agencies in or serving
an urbanized area (UZA) of 200,000 or more
population must complete this form.”7 A separate
form must be completed for each mode of service a
transit agency either directly operates or purchases.
Page 2 of the form is concerned with Security Items
(versus Safety Items on Page 1) and includes serious
offenses which are reported in Part I and less serious
offenses which result in arrests in Part II (a copy is
presented in Appendix C). The serious offenses
include both Violent Crime and Property Crime
incidents. The incidents are detailed by victim
(patrons, employees, or others) and by location (in
vehicle, in station, or other transit property).

The reporting format for NTD security data follows
the standards set by the FBI Uniform Crime
Reporting (UCR) Program. Notably, the definitions
for crimes are taken directly from the FBI Uniform
Crime Reporting Handbook (1984). Thus, Part I
Violent Crime includes crimes against individuals
and is classified as homicide, forcible rape, robbery,
and aggravated assault.

Violent Crimes Definitions
Homicide: The killing of one or more human beings
by another. This includes murder, non-negligent
manslaughter and manslaughter by negligence.
Forcible Rape: The carnal knowledge of a female
forcibly and against her will. This includes assault
to rape or attempt to rape.

Unfortunately, the less serious offenses in Part II
including “other assaults” and “disorderly conduct”
are only broken down by location and do not contain
details regarding who the victims are. Since this
report focuses on the security of bus operators, i.e.
“in vehicle employees,” the NTD data may be
viewed as incomplete and do not fully or accurately
reflect the reality of criminal activities to which bus
operators are subject. This sentiment was expressed
by at least one respondent to the questionnaire, who
felt that onboard criminal activity is underreported in
the NTD. Of course, a database is only as good as
the data it contains. The burden still lies on transit
agencies to report accurate and complete data. It is
crucial that systematic methods are in place for
compiling, maintaining, and reporting data, not only
to fulfill the federal government requirements of
NTD reporting, but also for the management and
evaluation needs of the local transit agency and its
funding partners.

Robbery: The taking or attempting to take anything of
value from the care, custody, or control of a
person or persons by force or threat of force or
violence and/or by putting the victim in fear. The
use or threat of force includes firearms, knives or
cutting instruments, other dangerous weapons
(clubs, acid, explosives), and strong-arm
techniques (hands, fists, feet).
Aggravated Assault: An unlawful attack by one
person upon another for the purpose of inflicting
severe or aggravated bodily injury. This type of
assault usually is accompanied by the use of a
weapon or by means likely to produce death or
great bodily harm.
SOURCE: NTD Reporting Manual, (1999).

The NTD data reveal that bus operators are
relatively secure from violent crime, despite wellpublicized exceptional incidents like what happened
in Seattle. By far, the most common violent offense
against bus operators is aggravated assault. In the
first reporting year in which the NTD was expanded
to include crime statistics, there were reported 617
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The NTD summarizes in-vehicle violent crime
against transit employees for all agencies serving
areas both greater and lesser than 1 million in
population; however, the mode detail is lost in this
summary. Still, knowing that the bulk of transit
service is supplied and consumed on motorbuses the
reader can confidently compare and contrast Figures
2 and 3. Note that, although the hierarchies of which
crimes are more frequent within each figure are the
same (i.e. assaults outnumber robberies, which
outnumber rapes and homicides), the y-axis and data
in Figure 3 indicate substantially greater incidents of
crime in larger cities than smaller ones.

aggravated assaults nationwide against bus
operators. Three years later, in 1999, there were
377—a decrease of 39%. The second most common
offense against bus operators is robbery, with 86
reported incidents in 1996 down to 65 in 1999—a
24% decrease. In the first two years, there were no
rapes committed onboard against women bus
operators; there were two incidents in 1998 and four
in 1999. Onboard homicide is virtually unheard of,
except for the killing of operator Mark McLaughlin
in Seattle in 1998.
There were no reported
homicides in years 1996, 1997, and 1999. The fouryear trends for the four violent crime categories are
represented graphically in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Violence Against Bus Operators
Violent Crimes Against Transit Employees
In Vehicle, Motorbus Only
SOURCE: NTD
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Finally, for the reader’s information, Table 1
indicates the latest available (i.e. reporting year
1999) NTD violent crime data for the 55 transit
agencies solicited to provide information
regarding their security practices for this
report. As expected, the larger crime incident
numbers almost exclusively belong to the
larger bus systems, i.e. systems with the
greatest amounts of both service supplied and
consumed, serving the larger metro areas.
Systems with the most assaults reported
include those serving Minneapolis (49),
Miami (34), Boston (32), Chicago (25), Fort
Lauderdale (24), Detroit (21) and Milwaukee
(20). Robberies mostly occurred on systems
serving Los Angeles (11), New Jersey (8), and
Oakland (6). The only reported rapes occurred
in Los Angeles (2) and San Diego (1). There
were no homicides of bus operators in 1999.

It is precarious to perceive actual trends in transit
crime with only four years of data; however, the
accumulated data to date indicate that violent crimes
against bus operators are decreasing. The declines
in transit crime parallel recent trends in most
reported crimes witnessed in cities throughout the
U.S. This makes sense. The bulk of public transit
service is found in urban areas; it is intuitive that
public transit service is subject to its environment,
and most violent crime occurs in urbanized settings.
Cops, Cameras, and Enclosures
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Figure 2 Transit Employee Violence – Smaller Cities

to more than 3.5 billion passengers along more
than 1 billion miles of routes on nearly 28,000
buses, these 55 transit systems reported only
321 aggravated assaults, 54 robberies, 3
forcible rapes, and no homicides; their
combined experience signifies that bus
operators are relatively secure from violent
crime.

Violent Crimes Against Transit Employees
In Vehicle, All Modes
Areas w/ Population < 1 million
SOURCE: NTD
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Still, no one wishes to become a crime victim,
and it only takes a few well-publicized
incidents to raise valid concerns of what can
be done to improve personal security.
Ignoring such concerns in the long run may
make it difficult for transit agencies to hire
and retain good bus operator employees.
Additionally, though incidents may be rare,
their impact can be fiscally significant in workers’
compensation payouts. The following sections of
this report highlight the security methods transit
agencies employ to keep their operators secure from
crime.

One might expect that transit in America’s largest
metropolis—New York City—would report higher
incidences of crime. However, in 1999 New York
City Transit reported no violent crimes committed
against its bus operators while on duty. The reader
should be cautioned in making too many
assumptions with the NTD data presented here.
Internal data collection and reporting procedures
vary among transit agencies. It is possible, but Figure 3 Transit Employee Violence – Larger Cities
unproven, that some transit agencies may
actively suppress crime statistics that may
Violent Crimes Against Transit Employees
In Vehicle, All Modes
cause irreparable damage to system patronage.
Areas w/ Population > 1 million
Knowledge of crime typically results in fear; a
SOURCE: NTD
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The point in presenting Table 1 is perspective.
Due to the nature of public transit service, bus
operators necessarily interact greatly with the
public they serve. In providing transportation
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Table 1 Select Transit Agencies & Crime Data
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1999 National Transit Database
Violent Offenses Against Bus Operators

Phoenix
Phoenix Transit System
Los Angeles
LA County MTA
Oakland
AC Transit
Sacramento
Sacramento Regional Transit District (RT)
San Diego
San Diego Transit Corporation
San Franciso
San Francisco Municipal Railway (MUNI)
Denver
Regional Transportation District (RTD)
Washington
WMATA
Bradenton
Manatee County Area Transit (MCAT)
Clearwater
Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority (PSTA)
Cocoa
Space Coast Area Transit (SCAT)
Fort Myers
Lee County Transit (LeeTran)
Gainesville
Regional Transit System (RTS)
Jacksonville
Jacksonville Transportation Authority (JTA)
Miami
Miami-Dade Transit Agency (MDTA)
Orlando
Central FL RTA (Lynx)
Pensacola
Escambia County Area Transit (ECAT)
Pompano Beach
Broward County Transity (BCT)
Sarasota
Sarasota County Area Transit (SCAT)
South Daytona
Votran
Tallahassee
Tal-Tran
Tampa
Hillsborough Area Regional Transit (HARTline)
West Palm Beach
Palm Tran
Atlanta
MARTA
Chicago
Chicago Transit Authority (CTA)
New Orleans
Regional Transit Authority (RTA)
Boston
MBTA
Baltimore
MD Mass Transit Administration (MTA)
Ann Arbor
The Ride
Detroit
Detroit DOT
Minneapolis
Metro Transit
Kansas City
KC Area Transportation Authority (ATA)
St Louis
Bi-State Development Agency
Newark
NJ Transit
Albuquerque
City of Albuquerque Transit (Sun Tran)
Las Vegas
ATC\VanCom
Brooklyn
NYC Transit
Cincinnati
Southwest OH RTA (Metro)
Cleveland
Greater Cleveland RTA
Portland
Tri-Met
Philadelphia
SEPTA
Pittsburgh
Port Authority of Allegheny County
San Juan
Metropolitan Bus Authority (MBA)
Memphis
MATA
Nashville
Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA)
Dallas
Dallas Area Rapid Transit (DART)
Fort Worth
Fort Worth Transportation Authority (The T)
Houston
Metropolitan Transit Authority (Metro)
San Antonio
VIA Metropolitan Transit
Salt Lake City
Utah Transit Authority (UTA)
Everett
Community Transit
Seattle
King County Metro
Tacoma
Pierce Transit
Madison
Metro Transit System
Milwaukee
Milwaukee Cty Transit System
TOTALS for 55 select agencies =
TOTALS for all agencies =

330
1,926
585
174
266
371
820
1,131
11
115
18
41
54
144
518
168
33
194
26
49
41
158
130
595
1,545
305
879
794
59
440
789
212
506
1,775
104
219
3,760
358
621
546
1,097
806
194
155
105
441
121
951
420
549
234
957
176
159
451
27,626
47,060

10,943
81,830
19,911
7,180
12,143
12,388
30,588
33,169
552
6,567
578
2,727
1,643
6,814
24,367
10,432
1,311
10,598
1,507
2,454
1,650
5,412
7,010
26,767
61,271
12,423
27,487
20,337
2,292
18,227
24,835
8,106
18,450
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3,652
15,049
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27,215
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6,360
3,906
18,153
4,658
35,065
20,318
16,984
7,454
33,602
8,747
4,738
19,580
1,001,606
1,719,040

nr = not reported
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32,733
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Survey Organization

TRANSIT AGENCY SURVEY

The survey form was arranged in four sections.
Under “Contact Information,” the respondent was
asked to provide the agency’s name as well as
his/her name, title, phone, and email address. A
second section asked for “National Transit Database
(NTD) Information,” specifically crime data, for the
agency’s most recent reporting year (1999).
However, this section was later deleted in midproject when the requested data became available
online via the NTD web site.

Contacting Agencies
Fifty-five (55) transit agencies were identified to
obtain information on what techniques they are
using to help protect their bus operators and
passengers, as well as how these methods are
perceived regarding their relative effectiveness and
cost. The list of agencies included most large, many
medium, and some small transit agencies from
across the U.S., including all transit properties in
Florida. A survey was developed as an HTML
(hypertext markup language) form and posted for
public access on the web server for the National
Center for Transit Research (NCTR). The HTMLformatted survey was developed so that a transit
staff person could access it online at his/her leisure
and complete it in about 10 minutes. The transit
agency staff person targeted to complete the survey
was the one most responsible for security onboard
buses. Because of variations in transit agency
organizational structures, actual respondents
included police officers, security directors, general
managers, planners, research staff and/or their
subordinates. Where possible, a specific contact
name was first identified via the American Public
Transportation Association (APTA)’s Directory,
agency web sites, phone and email queries, and
personal contacts of project staff.

Based upon the literature review, eight specific
security methodologies were listed in the third
section
of
the
survey
form,
“Security
Methods/Techniques.” If the transit agency utilized
any of the suggested methodologies, the respondent
was asked to rate each on its perceived effectiveness
(poor, fair, good, or excellent) and cost
(inexpensive, reasonable, or expensive) as a security
method, relative to the other methods the agency
employs. In the online form of the survey, the
respondent rated the security methods by simply
clicking on check boxes. Radio buttons would have
made computer analysis of the responses easier, but
it was decided to use check boxes because they can
be unchecked if the respondent makes an error. If
the responding agency does not currently employ a
particular method but has budgeted for its future
implementation, the respondent was asked to check a
single box indicating the same. The fourth section
suggested additional factors that may influence
onboard crime and encouraged the respondents’
comments in text boxes.

In October 2000, the identified individuals at the 55
agencies were contacted via email, telephone, and
snail mail as necessary to request their participation
and completion of the survey in either electronic or
hard copy format. In the Spring of 2001, project
staff followed up with these transit agencies to
encourage completion of the survey.
In the
meantime, project staff made follow up telephone
calls to the contacts identified on the returned
surveys to clarify their answers, as necessary, and to
collect more in-depth information.

Response
As this report was written, 31 of the 55 agencies
solicited had responded, including 13 large (i.e.
identified in the 1999 National Transit Database
among the “Top 30 Agencies”), 11 medium, and 7
small (i.e. less than 100 buses). Most responded via
the electronic web form, but some mailed or faxed
their completed surveys.
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Although a response rate of 56% may be considered
respectable, the reader should be aware that the
respondents did not address or answer every
question. The actual number of responses to the
effectiveness and cost evaluations for some of the
listed security methods in the third section are,
therefore, low. Furthermore, some respondents did
not follow survey instructions and evaluated the
perceived effectiveness and/or costs of security
methods their agency did not actually employ;
follow up phone calls discovered the inconsistencies
and their tabulated responses were changed to reflect
truth. Thus, the survey results should not be viewed
as scientific; rather, the responses are suggestive.

Security methods may be classified differently for
analyses with different purposes. One classification
may differentiate technology or automated methods
versus manual methods using manpower.
Technology methods include communications
systems, covert alarms, video surveillance, and
CAD/AVL. Manpower methods primarily involve
security staff and/or police patrols.
The security methods for transit buses discussed in
this report may also be categorized as proactive,
reactive, or punitive. Crime prevention (proactive)
methods include video surveillance, “code of
conduct” postings, CPTED principles, operator cab
enclosures, security staff, police officers, and
violence prevention/anger management training.
Incident management (reactive) methods include
CAD/AVL systems, video/audio surveillance,
security staff, police officers, and self defense
training.
Punishment-based (punitive) methods
include state laws and local ordinances to protect
public transit employees and customers by providing
special punishments and laws that codify greater
charges for transit crimes.

The survey form, a listing of the 31 responding
transit agencies, and a summary of the security
methods they employ are presented in Appendix B.
Survey Summary & Analysis
In general, transit agencies typically employ more
than one technique to provide onboard security,
“packaging” various methods to get the most bangs
for their limited bucks. With few exceptions (e.g.
cab enclosures and training) most methods are
employed to protect both employees and customers.
Furthermore, most methods employed yield
additional benefits that address concerns other than,
and in addition to, security matters. For example,
though CAD/AVL systems are typically procured
for their efficiencies in real-time fleet management,
their bus tracking features, integrated with advanced
communication systems and video surveillance,
provide significant advantages in responding to
transit crime. Onboard video surveillance systems
provide records of onboard passenger activity
including vandalism. The video can be used as
powerful evidence in prosecuting property damage
crimes. Visible onboard systems, security staff, and
interior designs that mitigate crime may facilitate
positive marketing efforts to discretionary
customers, instilling greater confidence in the
security of the transit system.

The results and analyses of survey responses for
specific security methods are presented in
subsequent sections of this report under the
subheading, “Survey Findings.”
Effectiveness & Cost Scores
For each surveyed method, a numerical score was
assigned, based upon the average scores of
respondents’
qualitative
perception
ratings.
Responses for “effectiveness” were assigned scores
as follows: poor=1, fair=2, good=3, and excellent=4.
Similarly, responses for “cost” were assigned the
following scores: inexpensive=1, reasonable=2, and
expensive=3. Finally, an “effectiveness to cost”
ratio was calculated for each method based on the
average effectiveness and cost scores of all
respondents. As discussed earlier, transit agencies
employ multiple strategies and, with limited
resources, must choose which to employ. The ratios
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may provide guidance to those transit agencies in
comparing proposed strategies. The average scores
and effectiveness-to-cost ratios for each surveyed
method are indicated in both Table 2 and Figure 4.
The reader is cautioned, however, not to blindly
seize the scores. The limited sample size of the
survey—31 transit agencies—may not represent the
unique conditions or circumstances of each and
every U.S. transit system. They may provide
guidance, but should not be used as the sole basis in
decision-making.

methods. However, the benefits of CAD/AVL are
primarily concerned with effective fleet management
and dispatch, which has a large impact on a transit
agency’s sensitive operating budget. The security
features of CAD/AVL may be viewed as added
benefits. Similarly, the benefits of onboard video
surveillance are shared among security, risk
management, maintenance, and marketing. The
survey for this project only asked respondents’
perceptions of the methods in addressing security of
bus operators.

The four highest rated methods in terms of
effectiveness were in-house security (average score
of 3.8), an enclosure to protect operators in new bus
specifications (average score of 3.7), plainclothes
sworn police (average score of 3.6), and an
enclosure to protect bus operators retrofitted into
existing buses (average score of 3.5). The three least
expensive rated methods were violence prevention
training (average score of 1.4), a panic button that
changes the message of the headsign and
plainclothes security (average score of 1.7 for both
methods). The three highest effectiveness-to-cost
ratios belong to violence prevention training (2.1),
in-house security (1.9), and plainclothes security
(1.8).

Interestingly, violence prevention training was rated
the technique with the highest effectiveness-to-cost
ratio. As discussed later, this may reflect the transit
industry’s conservative nature in that violence
prevention training has been the standard reinforcing
response to keeping bus operators safe from crime.
Changing times and attitudes are apparent, however,
in the application of more aggressive strategies.

Further analysis shows that sworn police
consistently rate high in terms of effectiveness; their
cost, however, also rates relatively higher than most
other methods. This could support the belief that
“you get what you pay for.”
Furthermore,
manpower is almost always more expensive than
technology due to annualized salaries and fringe
benefits.
Keeping in mind the survey’s narrow focus of each
method’s role in keeping bus operators secure from
crime, lower rated methods may actually warrant
consideration. For example, CAD/AVL rated a solid
“good” in effectiveness, but its cost was also rated
“expensive” which resulted in the lowest
effectiveness-to-cost ratio among all surveyed
Cops, Cameras, and Enclosures
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Table 2
Bus Operator Security Survey
Average Response Ratings

METHODS !

Effectiveness
(1 to 4)

Cost (1 to 3)

Effectiveness :
Cost Ratio

2-Way Radio

3.1

2.2

1.4

dispatch

3.0

2.3

1.3

headsign

2.7

1.7

1.6

CAD / AVL

3.0

3.0

1.0

Video Cameras Onboard

3.2

2.5

1.3

contracted

2.7

2.3

1.2

in-house

3.8

2.0

1.9

uniformed

3.0

2.1

1.4

plainclothes

3.0

1.7

1.8

contracted

3.3

2.3

1.4

in-house

3.4

2.2

1.5

uniformed

3.3

2.2

1.5

plainclothes

3.6

2.2

1.6

Specialized
Operator Training

self-defense

2.8

2.0

1.4

prevention

2.9

1.4

2.1

Structure to
Protect Operator

retrofit

3.5

2.5

1.4

new specs

3.7

2.5

1.5

Panic Button

Security
(Onboard)

Sworn Police
(Onboard)
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Figure 4 Survey Response Ratings
Average Ratings
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Effectiveness : Cost Ratio

4.0

additional demands of digital data transfer between
onboard advanced technology “probes” (e.g.
automatic vehicle location, video surveillance,
mechanical systems sensors, et. al.) and their
associated off-board automated central processing
units, the ability of a bus operator to speak with a
live human dispatcher, when possible, still has its
advantages. For example, an activated panic button
may signal the dispatcher that an emergency
situation may exist onboard a bus; however, voice
communication between dispatcher and bus operator
may confirm the panic button’s activation was
accidental, no emergency situation exists and,
therefore, no further response is necessary.

2-WAY COMMUNICATIONS
Although fixed route transit service implies both a
static schedule and route a bus driver must follow,
the environment in which the service operates is
dynamic. Because of unexpected occurrences, the
link between bus operators in the field and dispatch
personnel in a central control office is a vital one.
Central dispatch staffs with their broader viewpoints
are ideally suited for allocating limited system
resources.
Thus, bus operators depend upon
dispatchers and road supervisors for direction in an
unplanned event.

Similarly, 2-way voice communication allows more
descriptive and accurate information during real or
potential security threats. For smaller or poorer
transit systems unable to upgrade onboard systems,
2-way radio communication is essential. Even for
systems employing advanced technologies, voice
communication is still a mainstay application.
There are a variety of technologies and methods to
convey communication signals; each has its own
strengths and weaknesses. A number of factors may
impact the viability and/or effectiveness of a
particular communication technology. Regional
terrain, building densities and heights, available
service providers, available radio frequencies,
system service area—alone or in combination, these
and other factors must be considered when choosing
a communication system or systems. (For a more
detailed discussion of communication technologies
for transit, the reader may refer to the U.S.
Department of Transportation’s publication,
Advanced Public Transportation Systems: The State
of the Art, including updates.)

Picture 1 A typical bus operator's workstation includes a 2-way
radio for voice communications with dispatch. Note the farebox
on the right.

The City of Detroit’s D-DOT public bus system is
testing cellular phones as a supplemental
communication system between bus operators and
support staff. D-DOT operations staffs have found
their existing 2-way radio system unable to handle

Most transit systems employ some form of
electronic system for voice communications.
Although some systems are upgrading their
communications systems to accommodate the
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D-DOT, however, is testing cellular for voice
communication as an alternative to an unreliable
radio system. They may find the cellular tolls
tolerable, at least in the short term, and preferable to
a large capital investment in a new communications
system. D-DOT may also receive more favorable
airtime rates than did Lynx.

increasing voice traffic and interference from
various sources. Now, some operators are issued
cellular phones when reporting for their runs. The
phones are preprogrammed with unique telephone
numbers for specific situations. For example, the
operator may connect directly with officers from the
City of Detroit Police Department who are assigned
to patrol transit. Other numbers will connect the bus
operator with dispatch, road supervisors, and
maintenance staff.

Reception to the cell phones by bus operators is
mainly positive, according to D-DOT security staff.
On the one hand, some operators do not like being
responsible for the phones, which they must sign for
at the beginning of their shifts and return to dispatch
staff at the end of their shifts. More operators,
however, prefer the reliability of the cell phones to
that of the existing 2-way radio system. In an
emergency situation when outside support is critical,
reliable voice communication is necessary.

An advantage, in the case of emergencies, is that
response time may be shortened since the call for
help is made directly to police, rather than through
the dispatcher. Police may more accurately assess
an onboard emergency situation by speaking directly
with the bus operator instead of having reports
relayed by a dispatcher. In effect, the “middle man,”
i.e. dispatch staff, is eliminated when time is critical.
D-DOT may find, however, as did Lynx in Orlando,
that regular cellular communications can be
expensive.

Another example of using cellular phone
communications to enhance onboard security can be
found in Dayton, Ohio. The Miami Valley Regional
Transit Authority (RTA) tested a pilot project in
which select students of a high school were issued
cell phones preprogrammed with the number for
RTA dispatch. The students were trained by the
RTA and Dayton police to ride and report uncivil
and criminal activities occurring onboard MTA
buses.8 The program continues today. Since bus
operators do not always witness every incident that
happens onboard, the students’ presence provides
supplemental visual monitoring.
The students
effectively function as undercover security “probes”
for the transit system and may contribute to a more
secure environment onboard the buses. In addition,
the students learn values in responsibility,
community service, personal safety, and respect for
authority.

Lynx tested an automatic vehicle location (AVL)
system provided by 3M. The system was outfitted
on six express buses. For the limited trial, the
chosen communication method was cellular.
Initially, the system was set so that the onboard
systems would automatically communicate with the
central computer in dispatch, reporting the buses’
locations at frequent intervals. Additionally, the
onboard computers were loaded with the route
manifests and also reported early and late arrivals at
designated time points. Orlando’s Interstate 4 is the
principle artery through the area for commuters and
tourists alike and is consistently congested. Lynx’s
express buses do not utilize exclusive lanes—
unavailable on the inadequate roadway—and,
consequently, often ran off schedule. The resulting
charges for frequent cellular calls the AVL system
made to report status, given the rates set by the
contracted local service provider, were far in excess
from what was expected.

Survey Findings
As a security method, 2-way voice communication
has a proven track record.
Of the survey
respondents rating 2-way radio’s relative
effectiveness, 25 (83%) of 30 rated it as either
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“good” or “excellent.” The average effectiveness
score for all respondents who report using 2-way
radio systems is 3.1, or slightly above “good.”
Its cost, relative to other methods, was rated as either
“inexpensive” or “reasonable” by 18 (72%) of 25
respondents.
The average cost score for all
respondents who chose to rate their 2-way radio
systems is 2.2 or slightly higher than “reasonable.”
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When combined with an onboard covert microphone
or video surveillance, dispatch and security
personnel may indirectly monitor the onboard
situation as it occurs. In such an event, the bus
operator presses the panic button and data collected
by onboard cameras and microphones are
transmitted via communication signals back to the
agency operations staffs. Digital data from newer
onboard audio and video surveillance systems is
received by and distributed to users on the agency
computer local area network (LAN). Off-bus
personnel may listen to and view the nearly real time
data wherever access to the LAN is available. In
advanced systems using automatic vehicle location
(AVL) technology, the problem bus and its location
is instantly highlighted and reported on the
monitoring dispatcher’s video display.
This
information is then passed on to security and/or law
enforcement personnel to hasten their response.

PANIC BUTTON
A panic button (a.k.a. “silent” or “covert” alarm) is
usually mounted in an inconspicuous location below
the operator’s window and/or on the floor for foot
activation. When pressed by the operator in an
emergency situation, various responses may occur
depending
upon
communication
system
configurations. The typical configuration alerts
dispatch personnel to an undetermined problem
onboard the bus. The dispatcher doesn’t know the
details, but agency policy dictates that police or
security officers are dispatched to investigate. The
outside destination sign may also change its message
to request assistance from the public to alert law
enforcement, unknown to an onboard criminal.

Survey Findings
A majority of respondents report that a panic button
which alerts dispatch of an onboard problem is either
“good” or “excellent” in effect (18 of 21
respondents) and “reasonable” in expense (12 of 16
respondents). The average effectiveness score is 3.0
or “good.” The average cost score is 2.3, slightly
higher than “reasonable.”
For systems in which the panic button changes the
destination sign to display an emergency message,
most respondents felt that its effectiveness was
either “good” or “excellent” (13 of 19 respondents)
and its relative cost either “inexpensive” or
“reasonable” (13 of 14 respondents). The average
effectiveness score is 2.7 or almost “good.” The
average cost score is 1.7, just below “reasonable.”
Transit staffs admit that bus operators make most
activations of the panic button accidentally. Still, its
availability provides one additional method bus
operators may actively employ to deter or respond to
onboard crime. The combination of the panic button
with newer digital communications technologies has

Picture 2 The panic button provides a means for the operator to
alert dispatch to a serious problem without using the radio.
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greatly enhanced its application and value as an
onboard security feature. Transit agencies acquiring
new onboard systems should make sure that those
systems support a panic button.
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or early. If the real-time data includes status
information from probes of onboard systems—e.g.
APCs, fareboxes, engines, brakes, air conditioning—
the CAD/AVL system can report aberrations in these
systems and hasten a response from the appropriate
transit personnel.

CAD / AVL
Computer aided dispatch (CAD) and automatic
vehicle location (AVL) are applications of new
technologies from other industries that the transit
industry is beginning to adopt. Though AVL may
function independently or in combination with other
technologies (e.g. automatic passenger counters or
“APCs”), combining it with CAD yields enormous
benefits, particularly for bigger systems managing a
large fleet of vehicles in a timed transfer route
network over a broad geographic area.

This advantage of superior response time with
CAD/AVL systems is especially important in
matters of security. This is why many local
governments nationwide have quickly adopted
CAD/AVL systems for emergency medical services
and police dispatch. As discussed earlier, depending
upon configurations, a panic button that activates a
covert alarm, microphone, and/or onboard video
surveillance system may be an important
subcomponent of a CAD/AVL system in transit
buses.

A primary component of the system involves vehicle
tracking. Though other methods exist, more systems
implementing AVL technologies today opt for those
based on the satellite-based global positioning
system (GPS). The order by President Clinton in
May 2000 for the Department of Defense to
discontinue signal degradation has resulted in a tenfold increase in location accuracy for GPS users.
Early pioneers in the transit industry using GPSbased AVL had to settle for the ability to locate a
vehicle within approximately 100 meters. Now,
these same systems can expect to locate their
vehicles within about 10 meters. Furthermore, an
improved system, known as “differential” GPS or
DGPS, is available that uses automated correction
algorithms for sub-meter location accuracy. This
means the dispatcher can know—at any given
time—in which city block a bus is located.

For example, say a passenger, armed with a knife,
approaches the bus operator and announces he is
hijacking the bus. The hijacker warns the bus
operator against taking any kind of action; however,
the bus operator can, without raising the hijacker’s
suspicions, subtly hit either of the inconspicuous
panic buttons, one on the left panel or the other
mounted on the floor next to the brake pedal.
Instantly, the bus is highlighted on the dispatcher’s
computer screen monitor and the CAD/AVL system
also indicates the bus’ position as a street address or
other coded reference. The message on the outside
destination sign changes to warn the public of an
onboard emergency and requests they contact police.
A hidden microphone onboard the threatened bus is
activated. The onboard digital video cameras,
ordinarily recording at one frame per second,
increase their rate to eight frames per second—
considered full motion video. The real-time audio
and video may be transmitted over the advanced
communications system back to the dispatcher who
can now hear conversations and see movements of
the hijacker, bus operator, and passengers.

The point is that CAD/AVL systems can use GPS
technology and communications systems to
accurately track, in real time, the location of
equipped vehicles in the fleet. Prior to AVL
systems, the primary method of vehicle tracking
involved the dispatcher querying a bus operator via
2-way radio. The CAD application assembles the
AVL information along with other real-time data
that may be collected from onboard systems—for
every vehicle in the fleet—to assist dispatchers in
their decision-making. For example, the CAD
software can highlight which buses are running late
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mentioned in the prior
hypothetical scenario (save
for the onboard video
surveillance)
did
indeed
occur.
The transit police
intercepted the hijacked bus
within three minutes. Though
the suspect had alighted the
bus before police arrived (but
after stealing from passengers
and the bus operator), he was
arrested within the hour at his
home because of information
the police quickly obtained
from a key witness, i.e. the
driver of the taxicab who
drove him home.9
Yet another incident occurred
in Denver.
A passenger
armed with a knife assaulted a
female bus operator on a
Regional Transportation District (RTD) bus. The
CAD/AVL system enabled onsite police response
within four minutes. The assailant fled upon hearing
the police, but the bus operator and other passengers
were potentially spared more serious injuries.10

Picture 3 As viewed on a dispatcher’s workstation, an emergency alarm status gets top priority
over all other calls in a CAD/AVL system. (Image provided by Orbital.)

If equipped with mobile data terminals (MDTs),
transit police in patrol cars are dispatched
automatically and may have access to the same
onboard audio and/or video data; otherwise, the
CAD/AVL system highlights the patrol car nearest
the problem bus and the dispatcher contacts the
police for quick response. Police are best-equipped
and trained to handle hostage situations. The sooner
they can arrive onsite, the quicker they can do their
jobs. The more information they have concerning
the situation onboard the bus, the better they can
plan their response.

Obviously the preceding scenarios are rare in the
experience of American transit systems; however
they—and even “less critical” incidents—necessitate
quick response involving many complex decisions
and actions. The urgency of a criminal act that
involves human lives compresses these decisions
and actions into a relatively short period of time.
Time is crucial in responding to real-time criminal
events. Efficient CAD/AVL systems promise to
improve response via faster response times.

A similar, real, incident occurred onboard a Niagara
Frontier Transportation Authority (NFTA) Metro
bus. In 1998, NFTA upgraded an older radio system
with an integrated CAD/AVL system on all fixed
route buses, paratransit vans, road supervisor
vehicles, and transit police cars. The following year,
in March 1999, a man attempted to hijack a bus
carrying 17 passengers. The bus operator activated
the silent alarm feature and most of the actions

Finally, CAD/AVL systems typically utilize a
database to store event information, including the
location data obtained from the AVL component. In
the case of crime, this stored and formatted data
facilitates computer analysis using a geographic
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as “poor.”
The average
effectiveness score is 3.0 or
“good.”
Only
four
respondents chose to rate the
relative
expense
of
CAD/AVL. All four believe
that
CAD/AVL
is
“expensive.” Strong interest
in
acquiring
CAD/AVL
systems is indicated in the
survey
by
12
other
respondents who report their
agencies
have
budgeted
CAD/AVL
systems
for
implementation in the future,
including 2 large, 7 medium,
and 3 small systems.

Survey Findings

The AVL component may not
be available on all buses in
every system; transit agencies
typically conduct limited
operations tests before committing to full-scale
implementation. Identified suppliers have included
systems by Johnson Controls, Motorola, Orbital,
Transtech, Siemens, and Westinghouse. Volatility
in the transit supplier market, especially of newer
emerging technology applications, however, yields a
shorter list of suppliers today. Thus Westinghouse’s
system was acquired by Raytheon, which has since
been acquired by Orbital. With other system
acquisitions, Orbital appears to have penetrated the
limited and young public transit market most
extensively, boasting more than 40 projects,
including a recently awarded contract, along with
Motorola, for the Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority.

Seven systems reported experience utilizing a
CAD/AVL system, including four large and three
medium transit agencies.
Of these seven
respondents, six rated the effectiveness of their
CAD/AVL system as a security method as either
“good” or “excellent.” Only one respondent rated it

An early user of CAD/AVL in transit is Denver’s
Regional Transportation District (RTD). Initially
installed by Westinghouse in 1994, the system was
later maintained by Raytheon. According to its
product literature, supplier Orbital, which finally
took over upkeep from Raytheon, Denver RTD’s

Picture 4 A CAD/AVL system can automatically track the location and heading of a bus whose
operator has activated the emergency (covert) alarm. (Image provided by Orbital.)

information system (GIS).
An event history
database can be a powerful tool used for future
service planning, risk management, and resource
allocation.
For example, a GIS analysis of
emergency event data obtained from the CAD/AVL
system may produce a map indicating criminal
activities concentrated in a particular area of the city
or along a particular segment of a route. This map
could be used to leverage supplemental police or
security presence to address the crime problems.
The monitored audio and video may also be
recorded and stored for later access and analysis by
security, law enforcement, operations, risk
management, and legal staff, as necessary.
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CAD/AVL system was the “first large-scale
implementation of CAD/AVL using GPS.”11 The
security of bus operators and passengers was
considered among other potential benefits in the
decision to implement CAD/AVL on all RTD buses.
Initially the system included the benefit of a panic
button and covert microphone. Later, this has
facilitated the phased integration of onboard digital
video surveillance.
A recent survey by the Volpe National
Transportation Systems Center also documents
transit agency interest in AVL systems. Of 154
transit agencies reporting AVL activities, 61 are
operating, 25 are implementing, and 75 are planning.
The primary service mode benefiting from AVL is
fixed route service (127 systems) followed by
demand response (75 systems).12

CAD/AVL - Effectiveness
excellent

2

good

fair

4

0

poor

1
# of survey responses

CAD/AVL - Cost

# of survey responses

4

0

0

inexpensive

reasonable

expensive

Cops, Cameras, and Enclosures
p. 22

ONBOARD VIDEO SURVEILLANCE
Banks, the military, public offices, and even private
interests have been using closed circuit video
surveillance as an effective security method for
decades. Video surveillance of passenger rail
stations is a standard component of the system
security plans for newer rail systems. The public
transit industry has just recently begun to invest in
video surveillance for monitoring onboard passenger
activity, particularly along bus routes in rough
service areas. This is made possible via advances in
microelectronics and desktop computing due to
increases in processing power, functionality,
memory, miniaturization of components, and, very
importantly, decreases in relative cost. Pioneers in
the transit industry employed onboard closed circuit
analog video tape recording systems. Based upon
early favorable results, transit systems are now
rushing to procure the newer digital systems that
harness standard desktop computer data storage and
processing techniques.

Picture 5 The onboard digital video surveillance system's CPU,
including removable hard drive, is located in a secured locker
above the front wheel well on this low floor bus at BCT.

System Configurations
The onboard components include the cameras and a
central processing unit (CPU). On older analog tape
systems, the CPU is essentially a customized VCR
(video cassette recorder) using standard VHS (video
home system) tapes for storing recorded images. On
the newer systems, the CPU resembles a compact
standard PC (personal computer), without keyboard,
mouse, and monitor, but loaded with processing
software and a large removable hard drive to store
the digital video. At scheduled intervals, when the
hard drive is full, or when a recent onboard incident
is reported or noted, either the data from the hard
drive is downloaded to another device or the hard
drive itself is easily replaced with a blank one.

On average, between three and four cameras are
mounted inside a standard 40-foot transit bus,
according to the survey respondents.
Of 18
respondents, three agencies reported as few as two
cameras per bus. Two properties reported using five
cameras onboard 60-foot articulated buses. Onboard
video surveillance systems for public transit buses
typically support up to eight color and/or black-andwhite (cheaper) cameras.
Why the variation in the number of cameras?
Primarily it’s an issue of cost, as additional cameras
can also impact data storage and maintenance
requirements. The number of cameras a transit
system chooses, however, also depends upon the
relative importance of the various information
benefits a surveillance system can provide a transit
agency. For example, if deterring onboard crime
and resolving fare disputes are the most important

Cops, Cameras, and Enclosures
p. 23

challenges for a particular transit system, two
cameras may be sufficient—one mounted at the
front of the bus and pointed back to capture a
general view of the entire interior (see Picture 6), the
other mounted above the operator’s head and
pointed at the farebox (see Picture 7). If a transit
agency experiences significant loss due to
vandalism, a third camera mounted in either the
middle or back of the bus will provide greater detail
of passenger activity. To reduce or minimize claims
or lawsuits from accidents, cameras mounted in the
back and directed at the rear door (see Picture 8) and
one mounted in the front and pointed forward to the
street outside the bus (see Picture 10) may be cost
effective.

higher rate of, perhaps, up to 15 fps. Playback will
display near real time motion video; however, the
increased fps rate more quickly fills the hard drive
storage. The particular situation onboard may or
may not justify recording more detailed video. As
prices for standard computer data storage
consistently decrease over time, transit agencies
employing digital video surveillance will less often
face this trade-off between detailed video and
available storage space.

Picture 6 A camera mounted at the front of the bus provides a
view of the entire interior.

A digital video surveillance system may be
configured to automatically record images at a
specified frame per second (fps) rate. According to
a representative with supplier Kalatel, most
customers record at 6 fps. However, a slower rate—
like 2 fps—may be reasonable. Playing back stored
sequential images recorded at slower fps rates will
show very rough, “jerky” video, but for routine
monitoring this may be acceptable given a transit
system’s particular needs.
If the system is
configured with a panic button activating covert
video surveillance, or if a bus operator wishes to
note a specific situation in more detail, the recording
rate may be increased manually, to a pre-configured

Picture 7 A camera mounted above the operator's seat provides
a view of outside activity at a bus stop, boarding customers, and
fare payment transactions. Note the sign on the farebox, advising
customers they are being monitored.

Like CAD/AVL, onboard video surveillance
promises many benefits previously unrealized to the
transit industry. Again, video surveillance may
function either independently or as a subcomponent
of an integrated CAD/AVL system. As a security
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method, however, onboard video surveillance may
be viewed as both an effective crime deterrent and a
powerful tool towards capturing and prosecuting
criminals.

Second, the warning signs themselves are powerful
deterrents to onboard criminal activity. Whether
video from security cameras of holdups at
convenience stores shown on nightly television news
or the popularity of the television program,
“America’s Most Wanted,” the public, including
criminals, understands that video evidence has
become a key factor towards prosecuting criminals
in many cases. In fact, transit customers who have
been victimized by other passengers may expect to
find evidence from onboard video.
Though it is tempting to include signage on all buses
in the fleet, even those not equipped with video
surveillance, this may not be wise. What happens
when a customer is victimized onboard a bus not
equipped with video surveillance, yet signs are
posted stating the contrary? The customer may have
the expectation that the transit agency would be able
to produce critical evidence towards prosecuting the
criminal.
Transit agencies employing video
surveillance should also seek legal advice from
counsel knowledgeable in the laws of the particular
state.

Picture 8 A camera pointed at the back door provides additional
coverage of passenger activity.

It is important, for at least a couple of reasons, to
post notifications onboard the bus, advising
passengers that they “may” be monitored and
recorded via video and audio surveillance systems
(see Pictures 6, 7, and 9). First, naturally there are
privacy concerns. Although the interior of a public
transit bus implies a public space in which
passengers choose to occupy, some may consider
video surveillance unreasonably invasive. Most
regular transit customers, however, would probably
consider video surveillance for the purpose of
security as reasonable and, in fact, welcomed,
especially along routes in high crime areas.

Picture 9 It is critical, for legal reasons, to inform customers of
onboard surveillance.
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Examples of Incidents

Other customer testimonials included a letter from
an official with the Milwaukee County Transit
System who related successful use of video images
to identify high school students known to have
assaulted bus operators and passengers and to assist
police in their investigations of theft and vandalism
incidents. SunLine Transit Agency (Thousand
Palms, CA) reports successful use of video
surveillance in resolving disputes between operators
and customers and in reducing vandalism by
supplying local police face shots of “taggers,” i.e.
gang members making their distinct marks on public
property, including bus interiors.13

None of the surveyed transit systems provided
examples of potential threats or actual crimes
captured by onboard video surveillance. User
testimonials from one supplier, however, did include
a 1998 letter from the Deputy Attorney General of
Delaware who praised the use of video evidence to
successfully prosecute a child sex offender. A
paroled offender molested a young male onboard a
bus operated by the Delaware Transit Corporation.
The video surveillance system captured images
recorded during the incident that were subsequently
used by the Department of Justice to convict the man
for this offense.

Picture 10 Additional cameras can provide greater coverage of onboard, and some exterior, activities. (Image courtesy Kalatel.)
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Prior to the use of onboard video surveillance, transit
agencies had little recourse but to settle with
individuals or groups who attributed their real or
purported damages or injuries to the transit system’s
negligence.
Today, video surveillance can be a
powerful tool to fight unwarranted lawsuits brought
forth by some devious individuals and their lawyers
who anticipate extracting large sums of taxpayer
monies from financially strapped public transit
agencies. In one incident in Fort Lauderdale, a bus
was rear ended at a slow speed and temporarily
taken out of service. As the bus operator and
supervisors inspected the bus outside, the onboard
surveillance system recorded passengers conspiring
to seek injury claims against the transit system. At
one point in the recording, a woman is seen picking
up a crying baby, dancing in the aisle, and singing,
“We’re in the money…we’re in the money….” A
security official with the transit system is convinced
that the onboard cameras have saved the transit
system (a unit of county government) hundreds of
thousands of dollars in legal fees and settlement
costs that would have been incurred fighting bogus
lawsuits.

to transit officials, the bus’ surveillance tapes were
reviewed, and the bus operator was subsequently
fired.
Another transit agency in Florida has a policy that
the onboard video surveillance system does not
include a view of the bus operator while seated.
This was agreed upon by management prior to
implementation to allay the unionized bus operators’
concerns for privacy and that the system would be
used actively to find fault with their work and
discipline them. However, if the bus operator leaves
his/her seat, his/her movements are recorded the
same as those of passengers.
Apparently a veteran operator either did not realize
or remember this caveat as he left his seat to
confront a passenger still onboard the bus at the end
of the route. The bus operator instructed the
passenger to alight the bus. When the passenger did
not comply, the operator approached him. A verbal
argument ensued and then the two exchanged blows.
When the passenger still would not comply, the bus
operator radioed dispatch for police back up. Upon
arrival, the police listened to the bus operator’s
report, boarded the bus, and promptly arrested the
unresponsive passenger.

Onboard video surveillance systems provide obvious
security benefits for both employee and patron and
may be used to support bus operators in customer
disputes. Still, some systems have encountered
resistance from some operators, including acts of
sabotage. These agencies may have policies or
practices in place that ensure supervisors will not
proactively or regularly scan recorded video
searching for incidents in which bus operators
violate company rules.

However, the passenger insisted that the bus
operator first assaulted him and he responded in selfdefense. The police did not take the word of the
passenger, but instead believed the veteran bus
operator. After three months of jail time, the public
defender finally subpoenaed the video surveillance
images that indicate the bus operator striking the
passenger first. At last report, the public defender
planned to use the video evidence to free the
supposed “victim.” Charges against both the bus
operator and even the responding police officers,
who were shown in the video potentially violating
procedures, may be pending.

However, recorded video may also support
customers’ valid complaints against errant bus
operators. In one Florida transit agency, a bus
operator was caught on video in a compromising
sexual situation with a female passenger inside a bus
not in service. Apparently he didn’t know that the
onboard cameras continue to operate for a time after
the ignition is shut off. The passenger complained

During a site visit to the same agency, a project staff
person was shown video of a bus operator who
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demonstrated less than exemplary customer service.
The operator was running behind schedule on the
route’s last run in the evening. At a stop a man
boarded the bus and asked for route information.
The operator ignored him as another man boarded
and paid his fare. A seated passenger stood up and
handed the inquiring man a schedule and map to
consult. The man stood in the front doorway, using
the bus’ interior light to read the map. The bus
operator complained that she was running late and
had to leave. She attempted to close the door on
him. A verbal argument ensued, further delaying the
bus. The bus operator finally succeeded in getting
the man off the bus and pulled away. The
surveillance system captured the audio and video of
the operator closing the door on this man while he
was standing in the doorway trying to get route
information from the map that another customer had
provided because the operator ignored his request.
This recorded incident would have made excellent
training material, but the transit system’s policy
against actively using the system against bus
operators prevented it.
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Survey Findings
It seems that the newer applications of onboard
technology support the notion that you get what you
pay for.
The few properties surveyed with
CAD/AVL thought it is effective but expensive.
Similarly, respondents rating onboard video
surveillance mostly feel it is either “good” or
“excellent” (13 of 17 total respondents using video
surveillance). The average effectiveness score is
3.2, which is above “good.”
Respondents are evenly split on the cost of video
surveillance between “reasonable” and “expensive”
(7 respondents each). The average cost score is,
therefore, 2.5 or right in the middle of “expensive”
and “reasonable.”
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powers of arrest, security officers can reasonably
detain offenders until sworn police officers from the
local jurisdiction arrive on scene to take over. Some
states may even permit security officers to issue
citations for violations of local ordinances.

POLICE & SECURITY
Despite the availability of technologies to deter
crime and facilitate response, cameras and sensors
cannot completely replace the need for warm bodies
specially skilled and trained in providing security.
Undoubtedly, the presence of security or police
officers onboard transit buses reinforces operators’
confidence in feeling secure from crime. They feel
that someone with authority is looking out for them,
allowing them to focus their attentions on safely
operating the buses.

The point is that, with a contracted security force
dedicated to protecting the transit system, sworn
police officers may be freed up for more serious
crimes. This can provide significant savings for a
transit system that pays for police service.
Sworn Police Officers
Just as there are a variety of ways the provision of
public transit service is organized at the local level
(e.g. by city, county, special district), arrangements
for police protection of the transit system are
similarly diverse. Depending upon the level of
criminal activity the system experiences, a transit
system may not regularly utilize police services. As
a public service, the transit system may enjoy police
coverage just as any other public facility or
transportation network. For example, it is a given
that any city will have police officers in cars
patrolling public streets. Similarly, transit service
may be viewed simply as another mode of
transportation funded by the same taxpayers who
also pay for and expect police protection. Therefore,
police officers will protect the public’s investment in
transit service and facilities by enforcing public
laws. A written Memorandum of Understanding
may formalize this arrangement between law
enforcement and transit management.

Security Guards
The Wackenhut Corporation of Palm Beach
Gardens, Florida, provides contracted security for a
number of transit systems in the U.S. According to
a spokesperson, most transit clients utilize
Wackenhut’s elite security officers who: possess
prior experience in law enforcement or are graduates
of police training programs; include former members
of military elite groups like the Marines, Delta
Force, or Green Berets; have a two-year degree in
criminal justice; and undergo a background
investigation similar to sworn police. Most are
armed and are assigned primarily to guard fixed
facilities, like transit centers, rail stations, and
parking lots. At least one client—Milwaukee
County
Transit
System—however,
utilizes
uniformed Wackenhut officers for onboard bus
patrols. As in many other transit systems, onboard
patrols provide a visible presence of security on
Milwaukee’s public bus system.

Public scrutiny of democratic government and
certain political philosophies have resulted in tight
budgets for nearly all public services, including law
enforcement. As a result, some police departments
have understandably resorted to incremental pricing
of their service. That is, for each additional facility,
region, event, or service police are called upon to
provide protection, the labor and capital costs may
be quantified. As transit service expands or as crime
increases, transit agencies’ needs for police services

The advantage of using contracted security staff over
sworn police officers is primarily an issue of
resource allocation. Most crime incidents onboard
transit are misdemeanors, e.g. fare disputes, rowdy
behavior, vandalism, eating or drinking, et. al.
When confronted with an authority figure, these
offenders usually either comply or leave. Contract
security officers are fully trained and qualified to
handle these situations. Furthermore, with citizens’
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increase. Therefore, some transit agencies have
contracts for service with law enforcement, which
reimburse the police departments for their expenses
incurred in providing protection.
Police
management has discretion over whether to form
special transit police units or assign dedicated
patrols to the transit system, usually based upon the
transit system’s needs and ability to pay.

Sheriff’s Department that permits transit police
direct access to county facilities for jailing prisoners
seized on the DART system. Otherwise, transit
police would be dependent upon county officers for
transporting and processing prisoners following
transfer from transit police custody.
DART relies on its transit police’s Bus Patrol unit to
secure the bus system. A number of plainclothes
officers are assigned to ride DART buses along
routes that may experience criminal activity. The
onboard officers are supported by officers in patrol
cars who can quickly respond with back up
assistance as needed.

Another option involves the transit agency
contracting directly with off-duty police officers.
For a growing system, this may provide the best
solution in balancing needs and budgets. This
option also provides flexibility for adding or
reducing the numbers of police officers during the
year, in contrast to an annual contract for a fixed
quantity of service and officers. The Fort Worth
Transportation Authority (the T) hires off-duty
police officers for undercover onboard patrols.

Onboard Police Patrols
Through a Memorandum of Understanding with the
Muni, the San Francisco Police Department (SFPD)
has implemented a “Bus Inspection Program” (BIP)
to provide a visible police presence onboard Muni
buses. The BIP stands apart from the 28 officers
assigned to a special operations unit to address
transit needs. Regular patrol officers in each of the
city’s police districts are responsible for inspecting
Muni buses along routes within the district. The
inspection simply involves boarding the bus,
checking to see whether any problems or threats
exist, talking with the operator, and getting the
operator’s signature on a report form for proof of the
officer’s inspection. The SFPD officer may choose
to ride the bus for a portion of the route; either his
partner rides along or meets him in the patrol car
further along the route. Each patrol car team is
expected to make two inspections per shift.

Transit Police Departments
For greatest control over allocating law enforcement
resources, a transit agency may have state authority
to possess its own police force in-house. Transit
police departments are primarily found in the largest
metro areas where transit agencies provide extensive
multi-modal services over broad geographic areas
that typically encompass multiple political
jurisdictions. Examples include Baltimore, Boston,
Dallas, Houston, New York, Pittsburgh, and
Washington. According to data from the American
Public Transportation Association (APTA), there are
20 bus transit systems with their own police force in
the U.S. The key to an effective transit police
department is a good coordinating relationship with
existing local city and county police departments.

A similar program, named “Police-on-Board,” began
in 1996 in New Jersey. Agreements between the
New Jersey Transit Corporation and nearly a dozen
area police departments and sheriff’s offices have
resulted in a highly visible presence of law
enforcement on NJ Transit buses. Regular patrol
officers randomly board NJ Transit buses, note any
problems, and receive comments from customers
and operators. These random patrols supplement

For example, the DART Transit Police Department
in Dallas hired its first officer in 1988. Now, there
are over 160 officers patrolling buses, commuter
rail, high occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes, light rail,
and transit centers, including the downtown
transitway mall. DART Transit Police has an
interlocal agreement with the Dallas County
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Survey Results

efforts by NJ Transit Police officers. As part of the
initiative, NJ Transit buses feature special decals
which warn would-be criminals that either
uniformed or plainclothes police may board and ride
the bus at any time. The result is a greater sense of
security by both passengers and operators at little or
no additional cost to the transit agency or police
departments.

The questionnaire for this synthesis report included
the question,
“Do you allow uniformed police to ride the
bus for free?”
Surprisingly, not every transit system offers free
rides for police who are not part of an onboard
patrol. Of the 31 agencies responding, 25 (80.6%)
acknowledge providing free rides for police officers.
Either uniformed officers or off duty officers with
identification may take advantage of the free
transportation. Two surveyed systems—Phoenix
and Washington—provide special fare cards that
allow the transit system to track the frequency of
police boardings.

With the noted exception of Milwaukee, most
onboard bus patrols are conducted by sworn police
officers, rather than by contracted security
personnel. Also, besides ride checks by uniformed
officers like in San Francisco and New Jersey, many
systems utilize plainclothes police onboard transit
vehicles to target specific problems. For example, in
response to customer complaints or operator reports,
transit police may assign plainclothes officers to ride
buses along particular routes or in particular areas.
They may be looking for drug usage or dealing by
criminals who feel the interior of a bus provides a
haven out of view from law enforcement.
Plainclothes patrols may be effective in breaking
drug rings, arresting criminals consistently engaged
in illegal activities, or generally deterring crime
onboard. It is important to publicize both the efforts
(e.g. the notification decals on NJ Transit buses) and
the results. Security officials with the transit system
in Phoenix work closely with the media and local
high schools to advertise the activities of undercover
police. Whenever arrests are made, these are also
publicized to prove their effectiveness and to deter
future incidents.

Admittedly, the survey questions regarding the
effectiveness and cost of security and police were
poorly formatted, confusing, and thus yielded
uneven responses. The survey requested evaluations
of multiple combinations of both security and
police—contracted, in-house, uniformed, and
plainclothes. Some systems provided evaluations of
security or police that they did not employ. This
was discovered in follow-up phone calls. The data
were corrected to the extent possible; the reader is
cautioned in drawing conclusive results to apply in
their own operations.
In general, both security and sworn police were rated
either “good” or “excellent” in effectiveness. There
were few “fair” and only one “poor” ratings. Having
either security or police personnel in-house may be
viewed as more effective than contracted staff.

Free Rides for Police
Another relatively inexpensive method of increasing
police presence onboard transit buses is to offer free
rides. Whether on duty or off, by policy or law
sworn police are generally expected to respond as
law enforcement officials when they witness
criminal acts. Getting police to use transit outside of
regular patrols—e.g. for daily commutes and other
trips—can only serve to increase onboard security.

Cops, Cameras, and Enclosures
p. 31

For the four systems with in-house security, they
rated their effectiveness as mostly “excellent” with
an average score of 3.8. This contrasts with an
average effectiveness score of only 2.7 for
contracted security. In-house security was also
perceived as less expensive with an average cost
score of 2.0 versus 2.3 for contracted security.

Contract Security - Effectiveness
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4
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The seven respondents with in-house police were
split between “excellent” and “good” in perceived
effectiveness ratings; the average score is 3.4.
Contracted police rated similar in effectiveness at
3.3, much higher than contracted security at 2.7.
Costs for both in-house and contract police were
perceived similarly close, with an average score of
2.2 for in-house police being slightly lower than 2.3
for contract police (just above “reasonable”).
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Interestingly, whether security staffs are uniformed
or plainclothes has little impact on their perceived
effectiveness, rated “good” (average score of 3.0) for
both. Sworn police were rated significantly higher,
however, in both uniformed (3.3) and plainclothes
(3.6) forms. In fact, sworn police were consistently
rated higher than security staffs.
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supplement guided instructor training. The program
reinforces the transit industry’s traditional focus on
violence prevention. Ms. Debi Horen, formerly with
San Francisco’s Muni, developed the program based
upon experience from seven participating transit
agencies and the recommendations of professionals
from transit, law enforcement, and mental and public
health. The program underwent testing at more than
30 transit agencies and is now available through the
National Transit Institute (NTI) for about $200.

OPERATOR TRAINING & UNIFORMS
Bus operators undergo extensive training prior to
having full responsibility for operating a public
transit bus alone on the streets. For example,
trainees at Broward County Transit—Florida’s
second largest transit system—undergo eight weeks
of classroom and field training before they qualify to
operate a transit bus. Topics typically include bus
maneuvers, defensive driving, operating onboard
equipment, and customer relations.
Periodic
refresher courses reinforce learned skills as well as
agency policies and procedures. Training programs
have been developed in-house at some transit
agencies. Others purchase outside materials or
manpower resources.
Depending upon the
experience and needs of the particular transit agency,
the topic of onboard security may have limited
coverage or it may get significant attention in a
dedicated training module.

Self-Defense Training
Another philosophy in bus operator security training
has gained momentum in recent years. Proponents
of providing physical self-defense training to bus
operators emphasize they are not abandoning the
transit industry’s code of violence avoidance.
Rather, they feel that, given increasing incidents of
violence in the workplace, it is sound policy to
provide bus operators with knowledge of basic body
moves or positions to defend themselves in
situations in which they are obvious targets of
assault.

Violence Prevention Training
Until recently, the standard mantra of the transit
industry to bus operators regarding their personal
security has been to avoid incidents at all costs.
Operators are explicitly told not to do anything to
encourage or increase the threat of violence, for the
security of both themselves and passengers alike.
Security training for bus operators, thus, has
reflected this philosophy. Phrases like anger or
conflict management, violence prevention, conflict
resolution, verbal judo, tension de-escalation, and
risk reduction all invoke techniques designed to
minimize the risk of violence before it actually
occurs.

Pierce Transit, in Tacoma, Washington, has
provided such training since 1990. Designed by
local law enforcement official Jesus Villahermosa,
the training teaches operators how to defend
themselves from assaults while seated. In fact,
remaining seated is proposed as the best strategy
because the source of an attack is isolated from one
position only; standing up increases both the head’s
vulnerability to injury and the likelihood of losing
balance; the panic button, radio, and other
equipment resources remain within reach when
seated; and greater resisting force comes from
kicking while remaining in the seated position. In
the event of an assault, operators are trained to
respond with a number of techniques, including:
loud shouts to disorient the attacker; defensive
postures, blocking the attacker’s strikes to the
face/head with hands and forearms; upper body
offensive strikes using fists, forearms, elbows, and

Customers, Conflicts and You: A Transit Operator’s
Guide to Problem-Solving is a recently available
training program that has received much attention.
Developed under the sponsorship of the
Transportation Research Board’s Transit IDEA
program, the program is unique in that it features the
use of interactive CD-ROM technology to
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the heels of palms; lower body offensive strikes
using the feet to kick the attacker’s knees, scraping
his shins, and stomping on his toes; and powerful
spin and kick moves—all from the operator’s seat.

daily in their urban environments. On the other
hand, they doubted the effectiveness of self-defense
training in ending violence; rather, they felt its use
would simply escalate it, resulting in greater injury
or death. The experience of one system in Tacoma,
however, may mitigate these fears. As the word gets
out, self-defense training may become more
common as an additional optional component of an
overall security strategy.

The training is receiving greater national exposure
through training programs offered by NTI. One of
this report’s authors witnessed the techniques at the
Southwest Transit Association’s 21st Annual
Conference & Expo in January 2001. The same
presentation was to be offered at NTI’s “Transit
Trainers Workshop 2001” in April. Pierce Transit’s
Safety and Training staff, including manager Steven
Nunan•, made the presentations.

Survey Findings
Survey respondents were more likely to provide
traditional violence prevention training (20
responses) over self-defense training (4 responses).
Of the respondents who reported providing violence
prevention training, 15 of 20 rated its effectiveness
as a security method as either “good” or “excellent”
(average effectiveness score is 2.9). Most believe
the cost of violence prevention training is
inexpensive (11 responses) or reasonable (6
responses); none rated the cost as expensive. The
average cost score is a low 1.4.

Critics, however, believe that instructing bus
operators in physical self-defense techniques may
encourage them to become more aggressive when
confronting potential threats. This could expose the
transit agency to greater liability from individuals
who may suffer injuries as a result of an operator
using self-defense techniques he learned in
mandatory agency-sponsored training.
Pierce
Transit responds that any such training must
reinforce an agency policy that narrowly defines
when use of the self-defense techniques is
appropriate. A spokesperson for Pierce Transit also
asserts that their required training program actually
limits agency liability from operators who would
otherwise react without training and potentially
cause greater harm.14 In a decade of providing the
training, Pierce Transit investigated 16 instances in
which operators used the training and found their use
warranted and in compliance with the agency’s
established “use of force” policy.
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transit agencies that do not provide self-defense
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were sympathetic to the challenges operators face
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Mr. Nunan has since accepted the position of Director of
Training at the Chicago Transit Authority.
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Regarding self-defense training, the few responses
received were positive. Two rated its effectiveness
as “fair,” one each as “good” and “excellent,”
yielding an average effectiveness score of 2.8. All
four believe the cost of providing self-defense
training is “reasonable” (average score is 2.0).

In recent years, some transit agencies have followed
trends in corporate workplaces and have
implemented more casual dress for their operators.
Instead of long sleeve shirts, ties, and pants with
military-style stripes running along the legs,
boarding customers may encounter bus operators in
colorful polo shirts and khakis, especially in warmer
climates and newer, younger systems in the South.
Some examples may be found in Orlando, Tampa,
Fort Lauderdale, and Lubbock.
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The advantages vary, depending upon differing
perspectives. Operators may prefer casual uniforms
because they may feel more comfortable on the job
or if they are less expensive than traditional ones.
Transit management may wish to present bus
operators to the public who are more approachable
and friendly. In any case, marketing specialists
remind us that image is very important in how
various public stakeholders perceive the transit
service and vehicle operators are necessarily a
significant component of a system’s overall image.
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A Few Words About Uniforms
The late Jackie Gleason portrayed one of the more
enduring, though not necessarily endearing, images
of a public transit bus operator on the 1950s
television show “The Honeymooners.”
Ralph
Kramden operated a bus for Gotham City Transit.
Unlike another fictional character in a large east
coast metropolis, Kramden could not be described as
“mild-mannered” in either his personal or
professional life. For many Americans who have
never set foot on a transit bus, they may view bus
operators as strict and authoritarian. Indeed, the
traditional uniform of a bus operator as worn by
Ralph Kramden consisted of a tie, jacket, and a hat
with a badge. The image evokes power and
authority, similar to the uniform of a police officer.

Picture 11 Does Ralph Kramden’s uniform give him authority?

All of these reasons factored into the decision by
Lynx (Orlando) to switch from traditional to casual
uniforms in the early 1990s. Additionally, Lynx
staff cited the importance of keeping their bus
operators from being viewed by customers as having
punitive authority. This is believed to actually
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minimize the threat of violence to bus operators
from undisciplined youth and others who display
little respect for authority figures. The idea is not to
force a bus operator into the role of authority
because he will be perceived as a target for
resistance. This falls in line with traditional teaching
in the transit industry for the bus operator to avoid
conflict at all costs. Fare disputes within the context
of an increasingly violent and armed society should
not result in injuries or deaths.
Lynx reports that there was initial opposition to
casual uniforms from veteran operators. They either
did not feel comfortable in the uniforms or they
wanted to retain the image of authority the more
formal uniforms conveyed. However, in central
Florida’s tourism economy and favorable climate,
the colorful and attractive polo shirts soon won them
over.

Picture 13 Another uniform option at HARTline. A number of
transit systems are switching to more casual, and colorful,
uniforms for the comfort of bus operators, as well as to promote a
more customer friendly appearance.

No studies or evidence were found in the literature
review that specifically supports casual uniforms for
bus operators as a technique in violence prevention.
Some survey respondents cited local marketing
surveys that suggests customers prefer casual over
formal operator uniforms.
Well-designed and
attractive uniforms could also be viewed positively
in relation to crime prevention through
environmental design (CPTED) principles (refer to
“CPTED & Security Audits”).

Picture 12 A more traditional uniform is one option for bus
operators at HARTline in Tampa.
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CAB ENCLOSURES
In the most striking example of keeping bus
operators secure from crime, two transit systems—
Miami-Dade Transit (MDT) and San Francisco
Municipal Railway (Muni)—have begun to outfit
buses with partial enclosures around the bus operator
workstation. The enclosure is actually a door hinged
from the fixed modesty panel behind the operator.
The lower portion is metal and extends up from the
floor to about the height of the operator’s seat. From
that point and up the door is Plexiglas and is angled
back towards the top of the modesty panel. The
design for MDT buses does not actually result in a
full enclosure of the workstation; rather, the door
extends forward to a lower vertical support bar
adjacent to the farebox. The space over the farebox,
between the Plexiglas panel and the front
windshield, is open.
The supplier for MDT’s buses with the enclosures is
North American Bus Industries (NABI). In the mid
1990s, MDT officials visited NABI’s body
fabrications facilities in Budapest, Hungary. NABI
also arranged for tours of the local transit agency,
BKV. It was onboard BKV buses that the MDT
officials discovered fully enclosed bus operator work
areas. Mindful of assaults on operators in Miami,
MDT management pursued a similar design
modification for its bus orders with NABI. Since
1997 all new low-floor buses MDT receives from
NABI feature the enclosures. Early designs tested at
MDT had larger Plexiglas panels extending to the
ceiling; they have since been cut back to facilitate
transfer distribution from the operator to customer.

Picture 14 The door and Plexiglas panel increasingly seen on
MDT buses.

Similar enclosures may now also be seen on some
newer buses in San Francisco. Muni has an order
with Neoplan for 235 buses that include the
enclosure, including both 40-foot standard and 60foot articulated. Because these buses from Neoplan
are all high-floor, the enclosure necessarily varies
from those on MDT low-floor buses supplied by
NABI. Also, Muni’s version is more fully enclosed
than MDT’s. To date, Muni has received more than
160 of the new buses from Neoplan and has begun
to introduce them into revenue service.

According to NABI, Miami is the only site among
its American clients where buses feature the
enclosures.
Each add-on enclosure costs
approximately $1,800 to $2,000 per bus including
installation. A third-party supplier in Hungary
manufactures the enclosure/door and includes it as a
component with the body for assembly in NABI’s
U.S. headquarters in Alabama.

A spokesperson for Muni has indicated the push for
the enclosures came equally from two sources—the
bus operators’ union as well as management. Muni
bus operators have been the victims of increasing
assaults in recent years, many relatively minor but
some serious. Due to these assaults, Muni, which is
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a department of the municipal government of San
Francisco, has paid in excess of $10 million in
workers’ compensation claims and lost productivity.
Thus, the enclosures are viewed as a cost-effective
method of protecting bus operators and reducing
costs to the transit system.

Picture 16 From a customer perspective, would you feel secure
boarding this bus?

Pros and Cons
Even with their potential for increased protection,
the enclosures are not without critics, however, even
from the bus operators they are designed to protect.
During a site visit to inspect the enclosures, project
staff heard from numerous MDT bus operators who
had both positive and negative comments. On the
one hand, the enclosures can protect bus operators
from minor assaults, especially along difficult
routes. In some areas, it is not uncommon for bus
operators to serve as targets for rowdy youth
throwing objects such as rocks and even feces and
bags of urine at bus operators, particularly when the
front door is open to admit customers or when the
youth alight the bus. Halloween night is not a
pleasant experience for some MDT bus operators
who have learned to be wary of becoming victims of

Picture 15 The door and panel is designed to address potential
threats from the operator's blind spot.

Officials with NJ Transit are interested in the
experiences of both Muni and MDT. In April 2001
they visited San Francisco to see the enclosures and
talk with Muni staff. Internal discussions began
with the Transit Police Department and the
operators’ union. They, too, are concerned with
increasing assaults on bus operators. NJ Transit
buses have radios but do not feature video
surveillance. Also, agreements with many local law
enforcement agencies provide a significant visible
police presence onboard (see “Police & Security”).
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eggings. Muni supervisors report similar incidents
in the San Francisco bay area.

angry customer is not unlikely to have a few choice
words for the bus operator, a target who serves as
the only physically present representative of the
transit system at which the customer can vent his
frustrations. Some MDT bus operators believe the
enclosure will make the customer think twice before
attacking.
Other bus operators feel the enclosure enables them
to more fully focus on the tasks of safely operating
the bus, certainly a prime component of their job
descriptions. Some also cite the protection the
enclosure affords them from contracting contagious
maladies from their customers. At least one operator
related incidents of customers sneezing or spitting
on her.

Picture 17 Critics say this is no way to provide superior customer
service on transit.

Some bus operators also feel that the enclosures
discourage potential assaults from irritated
customers.
As previously discussed in the
Introduction, unlike a train operator, bus operators
are fully exposed to passengers who frequently
approach them with questions, complaints, or just
idle conversation. Customers may become easily
irritated over a fare dispute or other problem.
Imagine a disgruntled customer who had a bad day
at work, waits in the rain at a bus stop without a
shelter, and the bus arrives 15 or more minutes late
because of a wreck, traffic congestion, a breakdown
of the bus, or some other reason beyond the bus
operator’s control. When boarding the bus, the

Picture 18 Some MDT operators complain of wrist injuries from
customers grabbing transfers from the operators' hands around
the Plexiglas panel. A simple design modification—similar to a
bank teller’s window—may address this concern.
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assailant from opening the door, but which may
make a quick escape more difficult for the operator.
Many operators also complain of feeling confined or
isolated. They may suffer from claustrophobia.
Some complain of an uncomfortably warm
environment.
The enclosures may limit the
effectiveness of the onboard air conditioning system
that was designed for buses without the add-on
enclosures.•

Picture 19 Some MDT operators tie the doors open. The door
may also present an obstacle for maintenance cleaning staff.

The partial enclosure, however, will not fully protect
the bus operator from harm if someone really wants
to attack him. Some MDT operators expressed
concern they may become an easier target for
criminal acts against them, particularly because the
enclosure is not complete. An attacker may reach
around the Plexiglas panel in the open area above
the farebox and forward towards the windshield.
Though the attacker must get closer, he can still
point weapons around the panel or project objects at
the operator. The bus operator, however, would
have no means of escape other than climbing out the
side window—easier said than done. A gruesome
thought—imagine the result of a Molotov cocktail
hurled into the operator’s cab. The MDT doors
feature sliding pin locks—necessary to prevent an

Picture 20 King County Metro's articulated buses supplied by
Breda provide a small extension of the modesty panel towards the
front. This reduces glare from interior lighting at night, but is not
an explicit security feature.

Bus operators with King County’s Metro in Seattle
were unimpressed with a cab enclosure that was
•

The supplier DENSO recently developed an A/C unit
specifically to address the environment of fully enclosed
operator cabs on some European buses.
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tested on a bus for a time. Their complaints
included many of those voiced by MDT operators.
In the end, they just didn’t feel comfortable
relinquishing the overall positive relationships they
enjoyed with their customers. Due to the provision
of superior levels and high quality transit service,
there is strong public support in Seattle. Bus transit
is regularly used by a wide variety of people in the
Seattle area, including a significant number of whitecollar employees and middle class persons. Though
they still experience isolated occasional assaults,
Metro bus operators may be characteristically
protective of their valued relationships with their
customers.
The customer service aspect cannot be ignored.
What perceptions might differing patrons have of
riding a bus in which the bus operator is isolated
from them? How would regular patrons respond?
Would they or prospective patrons be less inclined to
ride a bus with the operator enclosures? How
similar or different are bus patrons and rail patrons
regarding their acceptance of isolation from the
operator? According to MDT staff, no complaints
have been received to date. More study is needed in
the wake of this new feature.•
Enclosing bus operators will not prevent every
assault—either real or perceived. Other proactive
methods, like video surveillance and onboard
police/security, may be more effective. Those bus
and train operators who have been threatened and
protected by enclosures, however, have become
advocates. Some risk managers in the transit
industry, seeing the additional view of economic
sense, are joining to support them.

•

The reader is advised of the forthcoming study,
“Assessment of Operational Barriers and Impediments to
Transit Use” sponsored by the National Center for Transit
Research.
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BUS AD WRAP
You’ve seen them moving along city streets. Is it a
bus or a moving billboard? It’s both. “Bus/full/ad
wrap” advertising on American transit buses is
increasingly common. A special wrap covering
composed of many tiny dots, loosely spaced, allows
large-scale artwork to cover the outside of a bus,
including the windows. Riding customers sitting
close to the windows can still see out, but those
outside the bus cannot see in; rather, they see
whatever design has been approved by the transit
agency for public view, including paid advertising
comparable in size to a billboard.

Picture 21 A typical transit bus with full wrap advertising. Note
the operator's window is left uncovered.

Thus, full wrap advertising is big money for those
transit agencies that most fully take advantage of it.
As the Federal Transit Administration has phased
out most operating subsidies during the 1990s,
especially for larger systems, transit agencies have
been scrambling to find additional local revenues to
cover these losses without having to raise passenger
fares. Furthermore, some transit agencies have
received praise from citizens and public officials for
attractive, eye-pleasing designs and artwork,
fostering goodwill from a constituency that typically
may not fully recognize the benefits of publicly
funded mass transit service. An added, unspoken
“benefit” is that the non-riding public cannot look
into buses and see the spare passenger capacity that
may exist along some routes, especially during offpeak service hours. A transit system may be viewed
as an efficient public operation by virtue of both the
public’s ignorance of empty buses as well as the
creative method of maximizing revenues.
In
contrast, other transit systems have been sharply
criticized for violating the local community’s trust as
a caretaker of public property because of gaudy bus
designs
that
contribute
to
an
overall
commercialization of life.
Unless specifically
exempted, wrapped buses may violate the spirit of
anti-billboard ordinances and laws designed to keep
commercialization at bay and out of residential
neighborhoods.

Selling advertising on bus exteriors can significantly
boost locally generated revenues beyond the
customary fares collected from passengers.
Gateway Outdoor Advertising, which contracts with
numerous transit agencies nationwide, collects
between $2,900 (in smaller markets) and $16,000 (in
Manhattan) per month per bus from clients who
advertise on transit bus exteriors using full wrap ads.
In their Miami market, Gateway collects $7,900 per
month per bus. A portion of these fees is returned to
Miami-Dade Transit for the use of its buses as
moving billboards.
Lynx, the Orlando-based transit agency serving three
counties in tourist-rich central Florida, runs its
advertising in-house with commissioned sales
representatives, thus keeping all of the $4,000 per
month per bus fees within the agency. One bus with
a preferred 12-month contract provides Lynx with
annual gross revenues of $48,000. If only half of its
168 peak-service bus fleet were covered in ad wrap,
the agency could potentially earn more than $4
million in one year—about 8% of Lynx’s 1999
operating budget and enough to significantly expand
service or purchase about a dozen new standard
buses.

But does full wrap advertising contribute to crime
onboard transit buses? That is the basis for debate
among transit staff. Marketing staff members are
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Administration, Ph.D. candidate Anne Lusk
(University of Michigan, Taubman College of
Architecture and Urban Planning) used on-site
observations, written onboard customer surveys,
visual preference surveys, and focus groups to gather
user and non-user perceptions of personal security
onboard buses and at bus stops. The study examined
the subjects’ perceptions in relation to various
environmental elements including, but not limited
to, colors, window views, cleanliness, interior
lighting, and advertising.

usually the concept initiators with support from
administration. Winning over skeptical operations,
maintenance, and security personnel can be
challenging. In the end, the potential for substantial
added revenues is hard to resist.
Unfortunately,
there are no published studies investigating any
connection between full wrap bus advertising and
actual criminal activity.
There is, however, evidence that suggests customers
may feel insecure and/or perceive the potential for
crime as greater on buses with full wrap advertising.
It is true that, although riding customers can see out
the windows, the view may be described as blurry,
as if one required a stronger eyeglass prescription.
Customers waiting at bus stops cannot see into the
bus before boarding; therefore, they enter the
enclosed bus environment unaware of potential
onboard conditions such as crowding and/or rowdy
behavior by undisciplined youth. A customer makes
the decision to either board, wait for the next bus, or
make alternative arrangements without complete
information. For the new or potential transit
customer, this perception may be powerful enough
to discourage him/her from using the service.

For the visual preference survey, the study targeted
three distinct population groups—bus riders,
potential bus riders, and non-riders. The participants
viewed 70 slides of actual bus stops and bus designs
from various sources. Their comments indicated a
consistent preference for large clear glass windows,
free from paint and advertising, which provide clear
sight lines into the bus from outside. Relating to
security, their comments included the need to see
into the bus before boarding to judge the interior
environment as secure or risky, as well as a desire
for witness eyes from outside the bus monitoring,
and thus potentially deterring, onboard criminal
activity. The study participants indicated a strong
distaste for the slides showing buses with windows
covered with advertising.
There is much more to the study than summarized
here, and the reader is encouraged to consider its
review. The purpose of the study was to discover
common, proven, customer-based design preferences
that bus manufacturers could reference to produce
more attractive buses for communities with public
transit service, resulting in increased patronage.

Picture 22 From inside an ad wrapped bus, the outside view
appears blurred. The distortion is worse at night for customers
trying to see landmarks or read street signs. The interior is
darkened due to both tinted glass and full wrap advertising.
Would a return to clear glass lead to a more secure environment?

In her recent research on bus and bus stop design for
a document to be published by the Federal Transit
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Survey Findings

gone so far as to conduct limited tests of an infrared
visualization system used by firefighters and police
in low visibility situations to counter the zero
visibility afforded by full wrap buses the police
would face when responding to an onboard crime.
An alternative in this scenario would be the use of
the real time covert surveillance feature available on
onboard digital video surveillance systems (refer to
the section, “Onboard Video Surveillance”).

The questionnaire for this synthesis report included
the question,
“Do your buses utilize “wrap around/full
cover/Contra Vision” advertising? If yes,
what is your assessment of its influence on
onboard crime?”
Of the 31 agencies responding, 27 (87.1%) report
having buses with full wrap advertising. Its relation
to onboard crime, however, is overwhelmingly
discounted in their comments. Some transit security
officials are uncomfortable with full wrap
advertising, but acknowledge they have little or no
evidence to support their concerns. In spite of this,
some transit policy boards are deciding to terminate
full wrap advertising.

In an interesting twist on the concern that full wrap
advertising may contribute to criminal activity, the
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
(MBTA) has successfully utilized a full wrap ad bus
at a bus transfer facility to monitor illegal drug sales
transactions and other crimes. MBTA police are
positioned inside the non-revenue service bus parked
at the terminal. When unsuspecting sellers and
buyers complete their deal, the police are there to
quickly arrest the criminals on site. Contra Vision,
the Atlanta-based supplier for Lynx’s bus wrap, even
promotes its product for covert surveillance
applications in various environments.

The publicly elected Board of Directors for the
Denver RTD recently addressed the issue of full
wrap advertising. For years, the RTD contracted
with a private advertising firm to bring in additional
revenues from selling full wrap advertising on bus
exteriors. As the profitability and, thus, proliferation
of full wrap ads increased, so did customer
complaints. Some customers were concerned about
their security when boarding full wrap ad buses
without being able to see into them first. Near the
end of calendar year 2000, the Board passed a
resolution reaffirming a stipulation of the existing
advertising contract that disallows advertising
placement higher than six inches from the bottom of
transit vehicle windows. The full wrap ads are being
phased out.

As it relates to the security of bus operators, there is
little or no evidence that full wrap advertising
contributes to offenses against them; however, it
may violate the principles of crime prevention
through environmental design (CPTED; refer to
“CPTED & Security Audits”) and can contribute to
the perception of an insecure workplace. Transit
agencies utilizing full bus wrap advertising should
be sensitive to this and objectively monitor potential
problems.

At AC Transit in Oakland, discussions with the
sheriff resulted in a change in agency policy
governing exterior advertising—bus windows may
no longer be covered. A representative with
Broward County Transit in Fort Lauderdale also
acknowledged “mixed feelings” concerning full
wrap advertising among the local police departments
whose officers must respond blindly to incidents
onboard ad buses. The Phoenix Transit System has
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soften the harshness typical of fluorescent lighting,
which unfavorably distorts the appearance of natural
skin tones. However, the Metro spokesperson
discounts its impact on onboard crime.

CPTED & SECURITY AUDITS
Promoters
of
crime
prevention
through
environmental design (CPTED) concepts claim that
unconscious perceptions or forthright observation of
physical surroundings can influence criminal
activity. Thus an urban area in which buildings are
neglected, windows broken, yards untended, or
criminal activity regularly occurs in plain public
view sends a message that residents and/or law
enforcement are not concerned with what occurs
there. A criminal may perceive it as a “free-for-all”
area in which he can carry out criminal acts without
fear of punishment.

AC Transit reports that discussions with the sheriff
resulted in the removal of exterior advertising
covering the windows on its buses. This proactive
move contrasts with the reactive move by Denver’s
RTD Board of Directors to prohibit exterior
advertising six inches above the bottom of bus
windows. In the former instance, the transit agency
took action to prevent crime on advice of local law
enforcement; in the latter, customer concerns for
security resulted in the corrective response by the
transit agency.

Applying this argument to public transit, the way
transit vehicles and facilities are designed and
presented may affect the personal security of both
employees and patrons. With the probable exception
of taste, the human senses play a significant role in
patrons’ perceptions of their experiences with public
transit service. Lighting, colors, views, sounds, and
even smells—these may all work together toward
attracting and keeping customers. Conversely, they
may repel potential customers if they are perceived
as unpleasant.

Unlike rail facilities, applying CPTED principles
onboard transit buses has not grabbed industry
attention.
An exception may be specialty or
premium services, like rubber-wheeled trolleys in
numerous city business districts. The exteriors of
MTA low-floor buses used on Metro Rapid service
in Los Angeles appear clean, uncluttered, free of
advertising, and feature clear glass windows. Did
the planners consciously apply CPTED principles or
do these vehicles simply exhibit sound and attractive
design principles lacking in standard transit
vehicles? Newer research in environmental design
in transit (e.g. Ms. Anne Luske’s report referenced
in the prior section on “Bus Ad Wrap”) may be
revealing.

Survey Findings
The questionnaire for this synthesis report included
the question,
“Has your agency utilized environmental
design techniques (e.g. layout, lighting,
colors, etc.) to minimize violence on board
buses?”

More typical are transit systems utilizing CPTED
techniques in the design of major fixed capital
projects, e.g. light rail stations, park & ride lots, and
bus transfer stations. This may involve lighting,
facility layout, and landscaping. AC Transit, Port
Authority of Allegheny County, Phoenix Transit
System, and the Central Florida Regional
Transportation Authority (Lynx) all report the
intentional use of CPTED design principles in bus
terminals and other passenger facilities. Light rail

Only five (16%) of 31 respondents claimed to have
knowingly implemented strategies aimed at
improving the onboard environment of buses. Of
these five, four relate to enhanced interior lighting,
i.e. keeping it on throughout the service day or
adding more lighting, resulting in brighter interiors.
King County Metro reports its buses utilize pink
fluorescent interior lighting. Presumably, this would
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transit systems in Denver and St. Louis have applied
CPTED principles at light rail stations.

2. evaluate the level of preparedness of each
system;

FTA Security Audit Program

3. share best practices used by other transit
police/security and operations personnel to
enhance security for passengers and
employees; and

The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency
Act of 1991 amended the existing Federal Transit
Act to require the Federal Transit Administration
(FTA) to issue regulations creating a state-based
safety oversight program for rail fixed guideway
systems. The resulting regulations are codified in 49
CFR 659 as the “State Safety Oversight Program.”
The focus on rail systems is understandable given
federal investments, passenger capacity, and public
visibility.

4. evaluate the quality of security provided by
transit systems for passengers, employees,
and system facilities.”15

Transit systems operating rail are required to
develop an approved System Safety Program Plan.
Essentially the plan identifies the roles and
responsibilities of various staffs, departments, and
agencies as well as the policies and procedures for
implementing and maintaining safety and security in
the transit system. The security of patrons and
employees is included in the plan. Since bus and rail
service are invariably integrated—at least to a
minimal extent—within the transit agency, bus
service may also benefit from the plan, though only
rail systems are required by law to participate.
In support of the System Safety Program but also for
all transit systems regardless of their size or modes
of service operated, the FTA offers free security
audits. The audits are conducted by a private
contractor and are voluntary for all systems, though
audits are a required feature of the overall System
Safety Program for rail properties. The FTA began
offering the audits in 1997.
According to the FTA, the objectives of the security
audits are to:
1. “provide assistance to transit agencies in
developing and initiating system security
program plans;
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if the weapons may be checked, no transit system is
going to allow bus operators to serve as “checkers”
of firearms onboard transit vehicles.

LAWS, PENALTIES, & RULES
Laws designed to protect transit employees primarily
deal with punishing criminals after they have already
committed an offense. By their nature emotionally
motivated and therefore somewhat variable, violent
acts are rarely preventable by words on paper. Still,
there have been incidents proven as “pre-meditated”
acts. To some extent, knowledge of laws and
penalties may serve to foster both an environment
and public attitudes that do not tolerate criminal
activity on public transit service.

In New York State, Senate Bill 5294 was proposed
in May or June 1997 but did not advance further.
In the U.S. Congress, the Protect America's Transit
Workers and Riding Public Act (House Bill 1080),
sponsored by Earl Blumenauer (D-OR), was
introduced 11 March 1999 and sent to the
Committee on the Judiciary. It was subsequently
referred to the Subcommittee on Crime on 24
September 1999. While the original bill did not
move out of committee, Rep. Blumenauer’s office
worked with the Amalgamated Transit Union and
Transportation Infrastructure Committee to have
portions of the bill included in a larger “Terrorism
Preparedness Bill” (HR 4210) that passed the House
but not the Senate. This included an amendment that
would require the federal government to research the
extent of transit crime, and develop a strategy for
protecting workers, passengers, and transit systems
from such incidents.

Survey Findings
The questionnaire for this synthesis report included
the question,
“Does your city/county/district/state provide
special penalties for violent perpetrators
against bus operators?”
Respondents for a number of agencies were able to
answer “yes” and either cite or summarize the laws.
From their answers, simple web-based research
obtained, in most instances, the text of the laws.
Selected portions of these laws are provided in
Appendix D of this report. Further research also
uncovered efforts to pass laws, successful uses of
civility “codes of conduct,” and agency policies
posted onboard transit vehicles.

A spokesperson from Rep. Blumenauer’s office
wrote, “We are looking at our options for this
Congress to work on this important issue. There is
some opposition in Congress to federalizing more
crimes, so we are also exploring options to raise
awareness and information on the extent of transit
crimes,
specifically
against
workers
and
passengers.”

Attempted Legislation
Arizona has tried to pass legislation to protect transit
passengers and operators every year since 1992. A
coalition of Arizona transit systems, labor unions,
transit advocacy groups, and politicians have led
various efforts. The most recent attempt has passed
the House. The historical pattern has been that the
bill typically passes the House and then dies in the
Senate. Blame for failure can be attributed to
organized efforts by gun rights advocates. Also,
anti-crime efforts have been at odds with the Carry
Concealed Weapon (CCW) permit law. Although
the CCW does allow public entities to restrict them

Successful Legislation (Laws)
There are a number of states that have successfully
passed laws addressing the security of transit
employees. Typically, the laws result in higher
classifications of offenses against transit employees
and/or patrons, compared to offenses against
unclassified persons. Because of higher offenses,
the penalties, including fines and/or jail time are also
substantially increased.
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operators. The statutes provide judges with specific
sentencing guidelines depending upon unique
circumstances. Offenses are classified as either
assaults (attempts at violence) or batteries (actual
violence). Classifications and penalties for assaults
range from misdemeanors to felonies with maximum
fines of $5,000 and/or prison terms between one and
six years, depending upon whether a weapon was
involved.
Batteries carry stiffer consequences
ranging from misdemeanors to felonies with
maximum fines of $10,000 and/or prison terms
between two and fifteen years. What is particularly
interesting about the Nevada Statutes is that transit
vehicle operators are included among police, fire
fighters, corrections officers, court officials, school
employees, and taxicab drivers.

The California Penal Code covers both employees
and patrons on transit property, including vehicles
and stations. In general, battery on all persons
occupying public transit property (i.e. vehicles and
stations) is punishable by a maximum $2,000 fine
and/or a year in jail. However, the penalties are
substantially higher if the criminal is aware that his
victim is either a passenger or a transit employee
doing his job. In such a case, the criminal is subject
to a maximum $10,000 fine and/or a year in jail. If
the victim sustains injury, the punishment may also
add time in a state prison of 16 months, 2 years, or 3
years.
The Florida Statutes cover public transit operations
employees. If they are victims of assault or battery
while on duty, the offense is reclassified to a higher
standard. For an assault, the offense is reclassified
to a first-degree misdemeanor, instead of seconddegree. Battery goes from first-degree misdemeanor
to third-degree felony. Aggravated assault changes a
third-degree felony charge to second-degree.
Aggravated battery upgrades second-degree felony
to one of first-degree. Finally, the use of firearms
during the offense subjects the criminal to a
minimum of either three or eight year’s
imprisonment, depending upon the type of firearm.

The Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes lists public
transit employees as a victim class for aggravated
assaults, which include both attempts and actual
violence. The standard for classification—“serious
bodily injury”—is different, however, for on-duty
transit employees. For other public servants, only
“bodily injury” is necessary for charging an offender
under Section 2702. An offense against transit
employees is classified higher as a first-degree
felony (versus second-degree felony for other public
servants). The burden lies on the prosecutor to
convince the court of the criminal’s intent to cause
or actions causing “serious” bodily injury;
otherwise, the lower classification of mere “bodily
injury”—which
does
not
include
transit
employees—may not apply.

The state of Massachusetts has a couple of laws that
may apply to public transit bus operators. One law
addresses criminals who interfere with the operation
of vehicles carrying “passengers for hire” by either
damaging the vehicle or disabling the vehicle
operator. If this law applies, the penalties include a
maximum fine of $10,000 and/or imprisonment of
up to 20 years. Another law addresses assault and
battery on “certain public servants” doing their job at
the time of the assault. Associated punishment
includes jail time between 90 days and two and onehalf years or a fine of between $500 and $5,000.

Texas Penal Code does not specifically identify
public transit vehicle operators as a victim class in
the section on assaults. Rather, the broad term of
“public servants” may apply. These public servants
must be in uniform or wearing a badge that identifies
them as such. For assaults against public servants
while performing their duties, offenses are
reclassified from misdemeanors to third-degree
felonies.

In 1997, the State of Nevada’s Revised Statutes were
updated to include increased penalties for assaults on
many public servants, including transit vehicle
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6. Thou shalt remain seated while LYNX
moves, to protect thy and others body.

A final example of state laws may be found in the
Revised Code of Washington. Transit operations
employees are covered, including operators,
supervisors, mechanics, and security personnel.
Additionally, the law mentions employees of both
public and private transit companies, including
contracted service providers. Assaults against these
individuals are classified as felonies.

7. Thou shalt request a stop 1 block before
thou needest to depart LYNX.
8. Thou shalt use exact fare, for thy driver
can not makest change.
9. Thou shalt present thy I.D. if thou art a
discount fare passenger

Code of Conduct
Communicating the contents of special laws and
transit agency policies to the public is a simple and
relatively low-cost method of crime prevention.
These rules are established to reinforce standards of
public behavior and maintain a pleasant environment
for the comfort of all patrons.

10. Thou shalt not distract thy driver while
the bus art in motion.”16
In other systems, particularly those serving larger
urban areas with non-homogenous populations or
where law enforcement has been lax, these rules
may need to be codified in municipal ordinances
and/or state laws. For example, local ordinances
exist in St. Louis and Detroit that support rules of
conduct onboard transit vehicles. Violators are
typically subject to fines.
Local municipal
ordinances may be necessary and/or preferable
where state laws either do not exist or do not apply
to the unique characteristics of public transit service.

A common way of informing transit patrons is
posting laws or agency rules for patrons onboard
transit vehicles. Most anyone who has boarded a
transit bus has seen signs advising them not to
smoke, drink, eat, and/or play loud music. For some
transit systems, rules are agency-imposed. The
expectation agency management hopes to establish
in the minds of patrons is that if you choose to use
this service, you will follow the rules. Again, for
some systems, these reminders are sufficient.

In Washington State, a list of eight specific
behaviors is spelled out in state law. The offenses
include smoking, littering, playing loud music,
spitting, carrying destructive agents, obstructing
access to or impeding the operation of transit
service, behaving inappropriately, and vandalizing
property. Violating any of these prohibitions results
in a misdemeanor charge, punishable by a maximum
fine of $1,000 and/or 90 days in jail.

Lynx, in Orlando, posts the ten “Customer
Commandments” onboard its buses:
“1. Thou shalt not smoke on LYNX, for it
breaketh State Law.
2. Thou shalt not play the radio too loudly,
for it offendeth other ears.

Pierce Transit, in Tacoma, posts an “Unlawful Bus
Conduct” notice that summarizes the state laws
onboard every bus. In addition to the eight offenses
listed above, the notice also includes references to
state laws prohibiting drinking alcoholic beverages
on transit property and punishments for assaulting a
transit operator. With these public notices, patrons
onboard Pierce Transit vehicles have a clear

3. Thou shalt not eat or drink on LYNX, for
it encourageth bugs to ride.
4. Thou shalt not curse or profane on
LYNX, for reasoneth number 2.
5. Thou shalt wear shoes and a shirt to cover
thy body.
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understanding of what behavior is unacceptable and
will not be tolerated. Furthermore, the force of law
and punishment backs up these rules.
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22 Jul
22 Jul
22 Jul
22 Jul
02 Sep
09 Dec

p. 2
p. 12
p. 12
p. 4
p. 6
p. 6
p. 7
p. 8
p. 14
p. 3

“Dallas Adopts Gun Safety Program.”
“Santa Clara Revamps Security Patrol.”
“Police/Security Workshop Scheduled.”
“Pittsburgh Transit, City Police Join Forces To Reduce Crime.”
“Video Camera Equipment Fights Crime, Lowers Costs.”
“WMATA Police Enforce 'Zero Tolerance' Policy.”
“Community Policing, Technology Considered at Session.”
“BC Transit Enhances Security.”
“Houston Metro Reaps Safety and Security Benefits of ITS.”
“Houston Metro Police Will Stay Independent
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Hyperlinks for Contacts & Other References
American Public Transportation Association (APTA)
• The international transit advocacy organization
• http://www.apta.com/
APTA Info Center
• Includes links to annual indices to Passenger Transport articles and the “Catalog of Member Products
and Services”
• http://www.apta.com/info/
Blumenauer, Earl
• US Congressman representing Oregon’s 3rd District and transit advocate who proposed federal legislation
providing protection for transit employees, HB 1080—“Protect America’s Transit Workers and Riding
Public Act”
• http://www.house.gov/blumenauer/press_releases/pr070.htm
Contra Vision
• Supplies full wrap bus advertisement material
• http://www.contravision.com/
DENSO Sales UK Ltd
• Supplies bus operator air conditioning systems
• http://www.denso-europe.com/index.asp
Gateway Outdoor Advertising
• Sells advertising space on transit facilities
• http://www.gatewayoutdoor.com/
Gavin de Becker, Inc
• Consultant & author regarding threat assessment, violence management, workplace violence, etc.
• http://www.gdbinc.com/index.htm
Greyhound
• The nation’s primary intercity bus transportation company
• http://www.greyhound.com/
Kalatel
• Supplies onboard video surveillance systems
• http://www.kalatel.com/
Loronix
• Supplies onboard video surveillance systems
• http://www.loronix.com/
Motorola
• Supplies integrated mobile communications systems, including CAD/AVL
• http://www.motorola.com/home/
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National Transit Database (NTD)
• The comprehensive source of operating and financial data for federally-funded transit agencies
• http://www.ntdprogram.com/NTD/ntdhome.nsf/?Open
National Transit Institute (NTI)
• Provides training courses in “Workplace Violence” and supplies a CD-based bus operator training course,
“Customers, Conflicts, and You”
• http://www.ntionline.com/
National Transportation Library
• The U.S. Department of Transportation’s online, digital repository of transportation literature
• http://ntl.bts.gov/
NEOPLAN USA Corporation
• Supplies buses with operator enclosures to Muni
• http://www.neoplanusa.com/
North American Bus Industries (NABI)
• Supplies buses with operator security panels/doors to MDT
• http://www.transit-center.com/NABI/index.html
Orbital
• Supplies CAD/AVL systems; acquired Raytheon (who formerly acquired Westinghouse) and Harris
“Fleetlynx” systems
• http://www.orbital.com/TMS/PublicTransit/index.html
Pinkerton
• Supplies uniformed and armed security personnel to transit
• http://www.pinkertons.com/
Prima Facie, Inc
• (See “Safety Vision Inc”)
Radio Engineering Industries Inc (REI)
• Supplies onboard video surveillance systems
• http://www.radioeng.com/
Safety Vision Inc
• Supplies onboard video surveillance systems; recently acquired Prima Facie, Inc
• http://www.safetyvision.com/
Siemens Transportation Systems
• Supplies “TransitMaster” integrated mobile communication system, including CAD/AVL
• http://www.ilgsystems.com/
Silent Witness
• Supplies onboard video surveillance systems
• http://www.silentwitness.com/
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Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP)
• Sponsors transit research
• http://www.tcrponline.org/
Transportation Safety Institute (TSI)
• Provides training course, “Transit System Security”
• http://www.tsi.dot.gov/
Ultrak
• Supplies onboard video surveillance systems
• http://www.ultrak.com/
Wackenhut
• Supplies uniformed and armed security personnel to transit
• http://www.wackenhut.com/security.htm
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Summary of Surveyed Transit Agencies' Security Methods (1 of 3)

State

Primary City

Transit Agency

Size

2-way
Radio

AZ Phoenix

Phoenix Transit System

medium

X

CA
CA
CA
CA
CO
DC
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL

AC Transit
Sacramento Regional Transit District (RT)
San Diego Transit Corporation
Municipal Railway (MUNI)
Regional Transit District (RTD)
WMATA (Metro)
Manatee County Area Transit (MCAT)
Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority (PSTA)
Votran
Broward County Transit (BCT)
Lee County Transit (LeeTran)
Regional Transit System (RTS)
Jacksonville Transportation Authority (JTA)
Miami-Dade Transit Agency (MDTA)
Central FL RTA (Lynx)
Escambia County Area Transit (ECAT)
Sarasota County Area Transit (SCAT)
Palm Tran

large
medium
medium
large
large
large
small
medium
small
medium
small
small
medium
large
medium
small
small
small

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Oakland
Sacramento
San Diego
San Francisco
Denver
Washington
Bradenton
Clearwater
Daytona
Fort Lauderdale
Fort Myers
Gainesville
Jacksonville
Miami
Orlando
Pensacola
Sarasota
West Palm Beach

Panic
Panic
Button - Button - CAD/AVL
Dispatch Headsign
X
F
X
X
X
X

X
X
F
X
X
X
F
X

X
F

X

F
X
X
X
F
F
F

X

X

X

F
F
X
F

X

X
X
X
X
X

MA Boston

Massachusetts Bay TA (MBTA)

large

X

X

MD Baltimore
MI Detroit
MO St Louis

Maryland Mass Transit Administration (MTA) large
Detroit DOT (D-DOT)
large
Bi-State Development Agency (BSDA)
large

X
X

X
X

X
X

NM Albuquerque

City of Albuquerque Transit (Sun Tran)

medium

X

X

X

OH Cleveland

Greater Cleveland (RTA)

large

X

X

X

PA
TX
TX
TX
WA

Port Authority of Allegheny County
large
Dallas Area Rapid Transit (DART)
large
Fort Worth Transportation Authority (The T) medium
VIA Metropolitan Transit
medium
Community Transit
medium
King County (Metro)
large

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
F

X
X
X
X
X

X

X

TOTALS - Method Currently Employed (X)

30

21

TOTALS - Method Budged for Future (F)

0

4

Pittsburgh
Dallas
Fort Worth
San Antonio
Everett

WA Seattle

F

Onboard
Video
Cameras
X
X
F
X
X
X

Contract Inhouse Uniformed
Security Security Security
X

X

X

X
X

X
X

X

X

F
X
X
F
X
X
F

F

F

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X
X

X

F
X
X
F

F
X
X

F

F

F
X
F

X
X
F
X
X

X

F

19

7

17

7

4

8

1

13

7

1

1

1
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Summary of Surveyed Transit Agencies' Security Methods (2 of 3)

State
AZ
CA
CA
CA
CA
CO
DC
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL

Primary City
Phoenix
Oakland
Sacramento
San Diego
San Francisco
Denver
Washington
Bradenton
Clearwater
Daytona
Fort Lauderdale
Fort Myers
Gainesville
Jacksonville
Miami
Orlando
Pensacola
Sarasota
West Palm Beach

Transit Agency

Size

Phoenix Transit System
AC Transit
Sacramento Regional Transit District (RT)
San Diego Transit Corporation
Municipal Railway (MUNI)
Regional Transit District (RTD)
WMATA (Metro)
Manatee County Area Transit (MCAT)
Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority (PSTA)
Votran
Broward County Transit (BCT)
Lee County Transit (LeeTran)
Regional Transit System (RTS)
Jacksonville Transportation Authority (JTA)
Miami-Dade Transit Agency (MDTA)
Central FL RTA (Lynx)
Escambia County Area Transit (ECAT)
Sarasota County Area Transit (SCAT)
Palm Tran

medium
large
medium
medium
large
large
large
small
medium
small
medium
small
small
medium
large
medium
small
small
small

MA Boston

Massachusetts Bay TA (MBTA)

large

MD Baltimore
MI Detroit
MO St Louis

Maryland Mass Transit Administration (MTA)
Detroit DOT (D-DOT)
Bi-State Development Agency (BSDA)

large
large
large

NM Albuquerque

City of Albuquerque Transit (Sun Tran)

OH Cleveland

Greater Cleveland (RTA)

PA
TX
TX
TX
WA

Port Authority of Allegheny County
Dallas Area Rapid Transit (DART)
Fort Worth Transportation Authority (The T)
VIA Metropolitan Transit
Community Transit

Pittsburgh
Dallas
Fort Worth
San Antonio
Everett

WA Seattle

medium

Self
Violence
Plainclothed Contract Inhouse Uniformed Plainclothed
Defense Prevention
Security
Police
Police
Police
Police
Training Training
X

X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X

X

F
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
F
F

X

X

X

X

F

F

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X

X

F

large
large
large
medium
medium
medium

X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

F

X
F
X
X
X
X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

F

F

TOTALS - Method Currently Employed (X)

4

12

7

13

15

4

20

TOTALS - Method Budged for Future (F)

1

1

0

1

0

3

4

King County (Metro)

large
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Summary of Surveyed Transit Agencies' Security Methods (3 of 3)

State
AZ
CA
CA
CA
CA
CO
DC
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL

Primary City
Phoenix
Oakland
Sacramento
San Diego
San Francisco
Denver
Washington
Bradenton
Clearwater
Daytona
Fort Lauderdale
Fort Myers
Gainesville
Jacksonville
Miami
Orlando
Pensacola
Sarasota
West Palm Beach

Transit Agency

Size

Phoenix Transit System
AC Transit
Sacramento Regional Transit District (RT)
San Diego Transit Corporation
Municipal Railway (MUNI)
Regional Transit District (RTD)
WMATA (Metro)
Manatee County Area Transit (MCAT)
Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority (PSTA)
Votran
Broward County Transit (BCT)
Lee County Transit (LeeTran)
Regional Transit System (RTS)
Jacksonville Transportation Authority (JTA)
Miami-Dade Transit Agency (MDTA)
Central FL RTA (Lynx)
Escambia County Area Transit (ECAT)
Sarasota County Area Transit (SCAT)
Palm Tran

medium
large
medium
medium
large
large
large
small
medium
small
medium
small
small
medium
large
medium
small
small
small

Structural
Retrofit

New Bus
Police
CPTED
Ad
Labor
Structure
Ride Laws
Onboard
Wrap
Concern
Specification Free
Buses

X

X

X

X

X
X

yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
no
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
no
yes

no
yes
yes
no
no
yes
no
no
no
no
yes
no
no
yes
yes
yes
no
no
yes

yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes

no
yes
no
yes
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
yes
no
no
no
no

yes
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
no
no
no
yes
no
no
no
yes
no
no
no
no

MA Boston

Massachusetts Bay TA (MBTA)

large

yes

yes

yes

no

no

MD Baltimore
MI Detroit
MO St Louis

Maryland Mass Transit Administration (MTA)
Detroit DOT (D-DOT)
Bi-State Development Agency (BSDA)

large
large
large

yes
yes
yes

no
yes
no

yes
no
yes

no
no
no

yes
yes
no

NM Albuquerque

City of Albuquerque Transit (Sun Tran)

OH Cleveland

Greater Cleveland (RTA)

PA
TX
TX
TX
WA

Port Authority of Allegheny County
Dallas Area Rapid Transit (DART)
Fort Worth Transportation Authority (The T)
VIA Metropolitan Transit
Community Transit

Pittsburgh
Dallas
Fort Worth
San Antonio
Everett

WA Seattle

King County (Metro)

medium

no

no

no

yes

no

large

X

F

yes

yes

yes

no

yes

large
large
medium
medium
medium

yes
yes
yes
yes
yes

yes
no
no
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes
yes
yes

no
no
no
yes
yes

no
yes
no
no
yes

yes

no

yes

yes

yes

25

14

27

7

13

F

large

TOTALS - Method Currently Employed (X)

4

3

TOTALS - Method Budged for Future (F)

1

1
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APPENDIX D: STATE LAWS
California Penal Code
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgibin/displaycode?section=pen&group=00001
-01000&file=240-248
(Selected text)
Part 1. Of Crimes and Punishments
Title 8. Of Crimes Against the Person
Chapter 9. Assault and Battery
§ 243.3. When a battery is committed against the
person of an operator, driver, or passenger on a bus,
taxicab, streetcar, cable car, trackless trolley, or
other motor vehicle, including a vehicle operated on
stationary rails or on a track or rail suspended in the
air, used for the transportation of persons for hire, or
against a schoolbus driver, or against the person of a
station agent or ticket agent for the entity providing
the transportation, and the person who commits the
offense knows or reasonably should know that the
victim, in the case of an operator, driver, or agent, is
engaged in the performance of his or her duties, or is
a passenger the offense shall be punished by a fine
not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by
imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one
year, or by both that fine and imprisonment. If an
injury is inflicted on that victim, the offense shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding ten thousand
dollars ($10,000), or by imprisonment in a county
jail not exceeding one year or in the state prison for
16 months, or two or three years, or by both that fine
and imprisonment.
§ 243.35. (a) Except as provided in Section 243.3,
when a battery is committed against any person on
the property of, or in a motor vehicle of, a public
transportation provider, the offense shall be
punished by a fine not to exceed two thousand
dollars ($2,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail
not to exceed one year, or by both the fine and
imprisonment.
(b) As used in this section, "public transportation
provider" means a publicly or privately owned entity
that operates, for the transportation of persons for
hire, a bus, taxicab, streetcar, cable car, trackless
trolley, or other motor vehicle, including a vehicle
operated on stationary rails or on a track or rail
suspended in air, or that operates a schoolbus.

(c) As used in this section, "on the property of"
means the entire station where public transportation
is available, including the parking lot reserved for
the public who utilize the transportation system.
Florida 2000 Statutes
http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Welcome/index.cf
m
(Selected text)
Title XLVI. Crimes
Chapter 784. Assault; Battery; Culpable Negligence
§ 784.07 Assault or battery of law enforcement
officers, firefighters, emergency medical care
providers, public transit employees or agents, or
other specified officers; reclassification of offenses;
minimum sentences.—
(1) As used in this section, the term:
(d) "Public transit employees or agents"
means bus operators, train operators,
revenue collectors, security personnel,
equipment maintenance personnel, or field
supervisors, who are employees or agents of
a transit agency as described in s.
812.015(1)(l).
(2) Whenever any person is charged with knowingly
committing an assault or battery upon a law
enforcement officer, a firefighter, an emergency
medical care provider, a traffic accident
investigation officer as described in s. 316.640, a
traffic infraction enforcement officer as described in
s. 316.640, a parking enforcement specialist as
defined in s. 316.640, or a security officer
employed by the board of trustees of a community
college, while the officer, firefighter, emergency
medical care provider, intake officer, traffic accident
investigation officer, traffic infraction enforcement
officer, parking enforcement specialist, public transit
employee or agent, or security officer is engaged in
the lawful performance of his or her duties, the
offense for which the person is charged shall be
reclassified as follows:
(a) In the case of assault, from a
misdemeanor of the second degree to a
misdemeanor of the first degree.
(b) In the case of battery, from a
misdemeanor of the first degree to a felony
of the third degree.
(c) In the case of aggravated assault, from a
felony of the third degree to a felony of the
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second degree. Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, any person convicted of
aggravated assault upon a law enforcement
officer shall be sentenced to a minimum
term of imprisonment of 3 years.
(d) In the case of aggravated battery, from a
felony of the second degree to a felony of
the first degree. Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, any person convicted of
aggravated battery of a law enforcement
officer shall be sentenced to a minimum
term of imprisonment of 5 years.
(3) Any person who is convicted of a battery under
paragraph (2)(b) and, during the commission of the
offense, such person possessed:
(a) A "firearm" or "destructive device" as
those terms are defined in s. 790.001, shall
be sentenced to a minimum term of
imprisonment of 3 years.
(b) A semiautomatic firearm and its highcapacity detachable box magazine, as
defined in s. 775.087(3), or a machine gun
as defined in s. 790.001, shall be sentenced
to a minimum term of imprisonment of 8
years.
Notwithstanding s. 948.01, adjudication of guilt or
imposition of sentence shall not be suspended,
deferred, or withheld, and the defendant is not
eligible for statutory gain-time under s. 944.275 or
any form of discretionary early release, other than
pardon or executive clemency, or conditional
medical release under s. 947.149, prior to serving
the minimum sentence.
Massachusetts General Laws Annotated
Copyright © West Group 1997 No claim to original
U.S. Govt. works
(Selected text)
44287 MGLA 159A § 31
Part 1. Administration of the Government
Title XXII. Corporations
Chapter 159A. Common Carriers of Passengers by
Motor Vehicle
Current through 1996 2nd Annual Session
§ 31. Wrongful interference with operation of school
bus or vehicle carrying passengers for hire; penalties

Whoever willfully, with intent to endanger the safety
of any person on board or any person who he
believes will board the same, or with a reckless
disregard for the safety of human life, damages,
disables, destroys, tampers with, or places or causes
to be placed any explosive or other destructive
substance in, upon, or in proximity to, any motor
vehicle which is being used for the carriage of
passengers for hire or for the transporting of school
children; or whoever, with intent to endanger the
safety of any person on board or any person who he
believes will board the same, or with a reckless
disregard for the safety of human life, willfully
disables or incapacitates any driver or person
employed in connection with the operation of such
motor vehicle, shall be punished by a fine of not
more than ten thousand dollars or by imprisonment
for not more than twenty years, or by both such fine
and imprisonment.
Massachusetts General Laws
http://www.state.ma.us/legis/laws/mgl/26513D.htm
(Selected text)
Part IV. Crimes, Punishments and Proceedings in
Criminal Cases
Title I. Crimes and Punishments
Chapter 265. Crimes Against the Person
§ 13D. Assault and battery upon certain public
servants
Whoever commits an assault and battery upon any
public employee when such person is engaged in the
performance of his duties at the time of such assault
and battery, shall be punished by imprisonment for
not less than ninety days nor more than two and onehalf years in a house of correction or by a fine of not
less than five hundred nor more than five thousand
dollars.
Nevada Revised Statutes
SB 264
(Became law 10/01/97)
ASSAULT AND BATTERY
NRS 200.471 Assault penalties.
1. As used in this section: Definitions;
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(a) "Assault" means an unlawful attempt,
coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent
injury on the person of another.
(b) "Officer" means:
(1) A person who possesses some or all of
the powers of a peace officer;
(2) A person employed in a full-time
salaried occupation of fire fighting for the benefit or
safety of the public;
(3) A member of a volunteer fire
department;
(4) A jailer, guard, matron or other
correctional officer of a city or county jail; or
(5) A justice of the supreme court, district
judge, justice of the peace, municipal judge,
magistrate, court commissioner, master or referee,
including a person acting pro tempore in a capacity
listed in this subparagraph.
(c) "School employee" means a licensed or
unlicensed person employed by a board of trustees
of a school district pursuant to NRS 391.100.
(d) "Taxicab" has the meaning ascribed to it in
NRS 706.8816.
(e) "Taxicab driver" means a person who
operates a taxicab.
(f) "Transit operator" means a person who
operates a bus or other vehicle as part of a public
mass transportation system.
2. A person convicted of an assault shall be
punished:
(a) If paragraph (c) of this subsection does not
apply to the circumstances of the crime and the
assault is not made with use of a deadly weapon, or
the present ability to use a deadly weapon, for a
misdemeanor.
(b) If the assault is made with use of a deadly
weapon, or the present ability to use a deadly
weapon, for a category B felony by imprisonment in
the state prison for a minimum term of not less than
1 year and a maximum term of not more than 6
years, or by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by
both fine and imprisonment.
(c) If the assault is committed upon an officer, a
school employee, a taxicab driver or a transit
operator who is performing his duty and the person
charged knew or should have known that the victim
was an officer, school employee, taxicab driver or
transit operator, for a gross misdemeanor, unless the
assault is made with use of a deadly weapon, or the
present ability to use a deadly weapon, then for a
category B felony by imprisonment in the state
prison for a minimum term of not less than 1 year

and a maximum term of not more than 6 years, or by
a fine of not more than $5,000, or by both fine and
imprisonment.
(Added to NRS by 1971, 1384; A 1981, 903;
1985, 248; 1989, 1010; 1991, 124, 774; 1995, 21,
1190, 1321; 1997, 434; 1999, 140)
NRS 200.481 Battery: Definitions; penalties.
1. As used in this section:
(a) "Battery" means any willful and unlawful use
of force or violence upon the person of another.
(b) "Child" means a person less than 18 years of
age.
(c) "Officer" means:
(1) A person who possesses some or all of
the powers of a peace officer;
(2) A person employed in a full-time
salaried occupation of fire fighting for the benefit or
safety of the public;
(3) A member of a volunteer fire
department;
(4) A jailer, guard, matron or other
correctional officer of a city or county jail or
detention facility; or
(5) A justice of the supreme court, district
judge, justice of the peace, municipal judge,
magistrate, court commissioner, master or referee,
including, without limitation, a person acting pro
tempore in a capacity listed in this subparagraph.
(d) "School employee" means a licensed or
unlicensed person employed by a board of trustees
of a school district pursuant to NRS 391.100.
(e) "Taxicab" has the meaning ascribed to it in
NRS 706.8816.
(f) "Taxicab driver" means a person who
operates a taxicab.
(g) "Transit operator" means a person who
operates a bus or other vehicle as part of a public
mass transportation system.
2. Except as otherwise provided in NRS
200.485, a person convicted of a battery, other than
a battery committed by an adult upon a child which
constitutes child abuse, shall be punished:
(a) If the battery is not committed with a deadly
weapon, and no substantial bodily harm to the victim
results, except under circumstances where a greater
penalty is provided in paragraph (d) or in NRS
197.090, for a misdemeanor.
(b) If the battery is not committed with a deadly
weapon, and substantial bodily harm to the victim
results, for a category C felony as provided in NRS
193.130.
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(c) If the battery is committed upon an officer,
school employee, taxicab driver or transit operator
and:
(1) The officer, school employee, taxicab
driver or transit operator was performing his duty;
(2) The officer, school employee, taxicab
driver or transit operator suffers substantial bodily
harm; and
(3) The person charged knew or should have
known that the victim was an officer, school
employee, taxicab driver or transit operator,
for a category B felony by imprisonment in the state
prison for a minimum term of not less than 2 years
and a maximum term of not more than 10 years, or
by a fine of not more than $10,000, or by both fine
and imprisonment.
(d) If the battery is committed upon an officer,
school employee, taxicab driver or transit operator
who is performing his duty and the person charged
knew or should have known that the victim was an
officer, school employee, taxicab driver or transit
operator, for a gross misdemeanor, except under
circumstances where a greater penalty is provided in
this section.
(e) If the battery is committed with the use of a
deadly weapon, and:
(1) No substantial bodily harm to the victim
results, for a category B felony by imprisonment in
the state prison for a minimum term of not less than
2 years and a maximum term of not more than 10
years, and may be further punished by a fine of not
more than $10,000.
(2) Substantial bodily harm to the victim
results, for a category B felony by imprisonment in
the state prison for a minimum term of not less than
2 years and a maximum term of not more than 15
years, and may be further punished by a fine of not
more than $10,000.
(f) If the battery is committed by a prisoner who
is in lawful custody or confinement, without the use
of a deadly weapon, whether or not substantial
bodily harm results, for a category B felony by
imprisonment in the state prison for a minimum term
of not less than 1 year and a maximum term of not
more than 6 years.
(g) If the battery is committed by a prisoner who
is in lawful custody or confinement with the use of a
deadly weapon, and:
(1) No substantial bodily harm to the victim
results, for a category B felony by imprisonment in
the state prison for a minimum term of not less than

2 years and a maximum term of not more than 10
years.
(2) Substantial bodily harm to the victim
results, for a category B felony by imprisonment in
the state prison for a minimum term of not less than
2 years and a maximum term of not more than 15
years.
(Added to NRS by 1971, 1385; A 1973, 1444;
1975, 1063; 1977, 736; 1979, 213, 1427; 1981, 12,
614; 1983, 673; 1985, 248, 2171; 1987, 515; 1989,
1178; 1991, 154, 774; 1995, 22, 903, 1191, 1321,
1335; 1997, 435, 1180, 1813; 1999, 141)
Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes
http://members.aol.com/StatutesP8/18PA270
2.html
(Selected text)
Title 18. Crimes and Offenses
Chapter 27. Assault
§ 2702. Aggravated assault
(a) Offense defined.--A person is guilty of
aggravated assault if he:
1. attempts to cause serious bodily injury to
another, or causes such injury intentionally,
knowingly
or
recklessly
under
circumstances
manifesting
extreme
indifference to the value of human life;
2. attempts to cause or intentionally,
knowingly or recklessly causes serious
bodily injury to any of the officers, agents,
employees or other persons enumerated in
subsection (c) or to an employee of an
agency, company or other entity engaged in
public transportation, while in the
performance of duty;
3. attempts to cause or intentionally or
knowingly causes bodily injury to a any of
the officers, agents, employees or other
persons enumerated in subsection (c), in the
performance of duty;
4. attempts to cause or intentionally or
knowingly causes bodily injury to another
with a deadly weapon; or
5. attempts to cause or intentionally or
knowingly causes bodily injury to a
teaching staff member, school board
member, or other employee, including a
student employee, of any elementary or
secondary publicly-funded educational
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institution, any elementary or secondary
private school licensed by the Department of
Education or any elementary or secondary
parochial school while acting in the scope of
his or her employment or because of his or
her employment relationship to the school.
6. attempts by physical menace to put any of
the officers, agents, employees or other
persons enumerated in subsection (c), while
in the performance of duty, in fear of
imminent serious bodily injury.
(b) Grading.--Aggravated assault under subsection
(a)(1) and (2) is a felony of the first degree.
Aggravated assault under subsection (a)(3), (4), (5)
and (6) is a felony of the second degree.

Texas 2000 Penal Code
http://www.cowtown.net/Cop_Shop/chapter_
22.html - Assault
(Selected text)

Revised Code of Washington
http://wsl.leg.wa.gov/wsladm/rcw.htm
(Selected text)
RCW 9A.36.031
Assault in the third degree.
(1) A person is guilty of assault in the third degree if
he or she, under circumstances not amounting to
assault in the first or second degree:
(b) Assaults a person employed as a transit
operator or driver, the immediate supervisor of a
transit operator or driver, a mechanic, or a security
officer, by a public or private transit company or a
contracted transit service provider, while that person
is performing his or her official duties at the time of
the assault; or …
(2) Assault in the third degree is a class C felony.

RCW 9.91.025
Unlawful bus conduct.

Title V. Offenses Against the Person
Chapter 22. Assaultive Offenses
§ 22.01. Assault
(a) A person commits an offense if the person:
(1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
causes bodily injury to another, including
the person's spouse;
(2) intentionally or knowingly threatens
another with imminent bodily injury,
including the person's spouse; or
(3) intentionally or knowingly causes
physical contact with another when the
person knows or should reasonably believe
that the other will regard the contact as
offensive or provocative.
(b) An offense under Subsection (a)(1) is a Class A
misdemeanor, except that the offense is a felony of
the third degree if the offense is committed against:
(1) a person the actor knows is a public
servant while the public servant is lawfully
discharging an official duty, or in retaliation
or on account of an exercise of official
power or performance of an official duty as
a public servant;
(d) For purposes of Subsection (b), the actor is
presumed to have known the person assaulted was a
public servant if the person was wearing a distinctive
uniform or badge indicating the person's
employment as a public servant.

(1) A person is guilty of unlawful bus conduct if
while on or in a municipal transit vehicle as defined
by RCW 46.04.355 or in or at a municipal transit
station and with knowledge that such conduct is
prohibited, he or she:
(a) Except while in or at a municipal transit
station, smokes or carries a lighted or smoldering
pipe, cigar, or cigarette;
(b) Discards litter other than in designated
receptacles;
(c) Plays any radio, recorder, or other soundproducing equipment except that nothing herein
shall prohibit the use of such equipment when
connected to earphones that limit the sound to
individual listeners or the use of a communication
device by an employee of the owner or operator of
the municipal transit vehicle or municipal transit
station;
(d) Spits or expectorates;
(e) Carries any flammable liquid, explosive, acid,
or other article or material likely to cause harm to
others except that nothing herein shall prevent a
person from carrying a cigarette, cigar, or pipe
lighter or carrying a firearm or ammunition in a way
that is not otherwise prohibited by law;
(f) Intentionally obstructs or impedes the flow of
municipal transit vehicles or passenger traffic,
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hinders or prevents access to municipal transit
vehicles or stations, or otherwise unlawfully
interferes with the provision or use of public
transportation services;
(g) Intentionally disturbs others by engaging in
loud, raucous, unruly, harmful, or harassing
behavior; or
(h) Destroys, defaces, or otherwise damages
property of a municipality as defined in RCW
35.58.272 employed in the provision or use of
public transportation services.
(2) For the purposes of this section, "municipal
transit station" means all facilities, structures, lands,
interest in lands, air rights over lands, and rights of
way of all kinds that are owned, leased, held, or used
by a municipality as defined in RCW 35.58.272 for
the purpose of providing public transportation
services, including, but not limited to, park and ride
lots, transit centers and tunnels, and bus shelters.
(3) Unlawful bus conduct is a misdemeanor.

RCW 66.44.250
Drinking in public conveyance -- Penalty against
individual -- Restricted application.
Every person who drinks any intoxicating liquor in
any public conveyance, except in a compartment or
place where sold or served under the authority of a
license lawfully issued, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
With respect to a public conveyance that is
commercially chartered for group use and with
respect to a for-hire vehicle licensed under city,
county, or state law, this section applies only to the
driver of the vehicle.
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